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 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The technological era provided new methods to supply and purchase product or services. These 
new methods are mainly related to the introduction of Internet and all the consequent 
developments. One of the most important is the so-called e-commerce which permits customers 
to purchase product and services outside the seller’s premise, through the use of websites. This 
practice permits generally to lower price for the customers and the operating costs for the seller. 
This is due principally to the drop of transaction costs. Moreover, the classical e-commerce 
developed in some variants. One of them is the possibility for the customers to create a group 
of people in order to exploit a sort of bulk price from the supplier. Successively, another form 
of e-commerce is born, providing a new type of selling strategy. This practice is undertaken by 
some websites which allow customers to pay a part of the product price, while the remaining is 
added by other customers. This system creates a list in which the first customer pays a little 
price and, when other customers replicate the same action, the first receive the product. It means 
that all customers have to wait new ones in order to receive their product. However, this practice 
seems to recall some famous pyramidal schemes or scams in which the majority of the 
participants suffer a loss.  
The main objective of this thesis is the analysis of the most important feature of this type of 
selling strategy in order to understand whether it can consider merely a variation of the 
pyramidal scheme or a new efficient type of sale. This analysis is conducted with the instrument 
provided by the game theory environment: a game is built up and then examined through the 
backward induction technique. Starting from the simplest case, successively some extensions 
of the same game will be investigated. The aim is to comprehend the customers and the seller 
behaviours in the basic game and then the behaviours changes in the extensions. By analysing 
this game, it is possible to analyse the reasons which lead these subjects to sell and purchase 
with this practice. 
 
The dissertation is divided in five chapters. The first one is dedicated to the detailed explanation 
of the mechanism of this type of selling strategy and the causes which lead to his launch. Then, 
the majority of the pyramidal schemes are considered in order to point out the similarities and 
the differences with respect to the new selling strategy and whether it can be connected with 
one or some of them. 
The central chapters constitute the core of the dissertation. The second chapter comprehends 
the construction of the game in order to point out the main key issues of this mechanism of sale. 
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The subjects are made up by the seller on one side and by a number of customers on the other 
one. The aim of the last ones is to reach a positive utility function while the former has to 
maximize his profit. With this analysis is possible to highlight the optimal strategy of each of 
them. In the third and the fourth chapters, the analysis proceeds with some variations of the 
initial game. These additional cases are characterized by different values of the key parameters 
in order to find a pattern which allows to collect the best response of the subjects to the changes 
of some relevant parameters. By comparing the initial game and the relative extensions, it is 
possible to underline the best case for the customers and the seller. 
The last chapter is dedicated to explanation of the results in the various cases. Moreover, the 
results are compared with the scenario provided by the real world. Similarities and differences 
are analysed in order to figure out whether the created game is suitable in order to replicate the 
real world websites dynamics and critical issues. Then, the actual websites are considered in 
order to discuss about some relevant issues. The aim is to understand whether this type of selling 
strategies is a genuine and profitable mechanism for both seller and players or, otherwise, if 
there are some measure that has to be applied in order to make it sustainable. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FEATURES OF NEW MECHANISM OF SALES 
 
 
1.1 E-commerce era characteristics  
 
Rupert Murdoch once said: “The internet has been the most fundamental change during my 
lifetime and for hundreds of years” and it’s difficult not to share it. In fact, the use of internet 
has changed radically various actions that people do on a daily basis: from interactions with 
each other, to the reading of newspaper and also the purchase of goods and services. These are 
only few examples of the activities that internet has contributed to modify, but a complete list 
would include almost all the activities that a common person is able to perform every day. 
Indeed, letters that people used to exchange through traditional mail have become instant 
messages through the use of internet connection. Newspapers have lost their physical 
component given by pieces of paper and they have become digital pages available on electronic 
devices. In the purchase of goods and services from the customers’ point of view is changed 
the purchase location but also the way people buy and sell. Nowadays customers are able to 
search for, buy and pay product in a place different from the seller’s premises through electronic 
devices with internet connections. This new form has taken the name of e-commerce. It has 
grown year after year, as demonstrated by several statistical data. An example is the research 
of the Istat, the Italian national institute of statistics. This institute produces annually a survey 
on the use of information and communication technologies by Italians citizens and enterprises. 
The survey1 published in December 2016 shows that: 
- 69.2% of households are internet-provided; 
- 50.5% of people aged more than 15 surfed the internet and made online purchases in the 
months prior to the interview (48.7% in the previous year).  
In particular, 28.7% of the people purchased online in the last three months, 12% in the last 
year and 9.7% before the last 12 months. Moreover, among the people who didn’t make a 
purchase in the last three months, 40.9% of them made online research to get information on 
products and services and/or sold goods online. Hence, there are 50.5% of internet-accessed 
people who are actual or potential customers of e-commerce; and 29% of people aged between 
16 and 74 made online purchases in the last 12 months. With these figures, Italy ranks 25th 
among 28 European states. It is well below the average value of the 28 EU countries, that is 
                                               
1 Istat. 2016. Cittadini, imprese e ICT. http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/194611 
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55%, and it is far away from the first country in the list, UK, with a percentage of 83%. These 
are only examples to show the growing impact of e-commerce. There are countries that, even 
if they have a quite low value of online purchases, have a growing trend, like Italy. Then, there 
are more advanced countries with an actual greater share of people who make nowadays use of 
e-commerce, like UK.  
These data are significant values and they contribute to explain the positive trend of e-
commerce in recent years. One example is the growth of one of the most famous and biggest e-
commerce operator: Amazon Inc. Its revenues increased year after year from 74,452 USD 
millions of 2013 to 135,987 USD millions of 2016, though these values are not entirely 
attributable to products sales2. In fact, one part of the revenues derives from “AWS”, i.e. 
Amazon Web Service, consisting in “sales of compute, storage, database, and other service” as 
reported on the annual report. Even if Amazon has gained the leadership of this sector with its 
competitive advantages, all the e-commerce companies can exploit several benefits which lie 
in their own nature. They can provide to customers easy access to store remotely located, even 
if a great importance has to be granted to marketing in order to drive traffic as much as possible 
to the website. Moreover, e-commerce has a lower level of costs related to physical store, like 
rents and wages of salesman because sales lies in online transactions so physical store are 
limited to warehouses. Therefore, the main economic strength derives from the low level of 
transaction costs with respect to a similar business with physical stores. For these reasons, e-
commerce enterprises have more possibilities to scale up the business paying particular 
attention to the logistics function.  
However, this kind of business implies some disadvantages and the most important ones are 
customers-related. In fact, buyers normally want to see, touch, try and obtain information about 
the products. This last aspect can be partially solved because nowadays people are able to look 
for information themselves in several ways through online research. Then, customers are 
subject to: scams because it’s not always immediate to certify the authenticity of the e-
commerce; problems with refund/assistance because it could be complicated or slow; a sort of 
“stress” due to the waiting time of the product related to the dispatch of it.  
Enterprises that are able to exploit advantages and to overcome disadvantages are then able to 
survive in the e-commerce market, even if the long-term ability to make profits also depends 
on the competition.  
One of the most important and common benefit that customers can exploit from e-commerce 
firms are lower level of prices. In fact, due to all the characteristic of this business, firms are 
                                               
2 Amazon Inc. financial data as reported on https://it.investing.com/equities/amazon-com-inc-income-statement 
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able to provide the products at a lower price with respect to a competitive and “classical” firm. 
Thanks to this, e-commerce customers are always looking for the best price on the market and 
for this reason new online selling strategies can be performed in order to provide the best prices. 
Indeed, with the development of the e-commerce sector, entrepreneurs and sellers developed 
new strategy of sales in order to attract a number of customers increasingly greater. Two main 
examples are the eBay Inc. and Groupon cases. The former allows two types of sales: a classical 
e-commerce activity where customers can purchase products from a plurality of sellers; and the 
possibility for the customers to participate to online auctions. This practice could have 
developed only because of Internet connection. In fact, only with these websites, sellers can 
reduce his transactions cost and provide auctions easily and at a lower price to the customers, 
placed everywhere. Otherwise, the seller should gather all customers in one place: this represent 
a relevant cost both for the seller (for example location cost) and for the customers (for example 
transportation cost). Groupon instead has a different type of sales in fact it acts as intermediary 
between the seller and the customers. The seller with the Groupon website is able to sell 
coupons that allow the customers to exploit discount on his goods or services. He is able to 
provide a lower price for goods and services because, thanks to Groupon website, he can reach 
a greater number of customers, exploiting economies of scale. Generally, Groupon developed 
a type of the group purchase technique. In fact, with this method a group of people is able to 
purchase goods or service at a discounted price. Basically, this is possible because a customers’ 
group purchases a significant amount of goods directly from the producer, so avoiding the 
intermediation cost. Normally in the group purchases, the customers contact directly the seller, 
but this implies that the customers have to spend time and effort in the research of other people 
and of the seller. In this situation of difficulty for the customers, Groupon set his activity. In 
fact, it is the intermediary that connect the seller with customers. In both cases (with or without 
Groupon), the seller should be able to provide a kind of bulk price, but Groupon make the 
purchase group more easy and convenient. 
Some of these new types of sales through e-commerce share an essential aspect: the customers 
cooperation. This last one can be voluntary or not and among this type of e-commerce, a 
peculiar one stands out: the so-called matrix scheme. 
 
 
1.2 The matrix schemes case: a genuine cooperation among customers? 
 
In the cluster of pyramid scheme there is a peculiar one that has to be analysed: the matrix 
scheme. The business model of this one is characterized by a company that sells products to 
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customers and gives them the opportunity to be rewarded with another product. Customers buy 
low price products and they are added to a waiting list for a product of higher value. It is not a 
purchase that imply the possibility to win a price, like in a lottery, because all customers on 
waiting list should receive the high value product. Nonetheless, the reward is not certain 
because of the presence of the waiting list which creates the pyramid structure, involving 
uncertainty. Matrix scheme functions as follows: the first customer on the waiting list receives 
the high value product (in a chronological order) when a predetermined number of new 
customers joins the list. The prices of the low value product and of the high value product are 
interconnected with the number of required customers who have to join the list in order to 
reward one customer. An example of matrix scheme is the following. The high value product 
has a price X while the low value product has a price 		" #$ 	, where n is the number of customers 
required in order to provide the high value product to a customer on the waiting list. In order to 
give another high value product to a second customer, the company require n more sold low 
value products. In this way, the pyramid is build up and the more n is great: 
- the more people are needed to provide high value products to a little number of customers, 
- the more decrease the probability to obtain the high value product for a new customer. 
The characteristic of this type of sales is that the customers buy a product of low value in order 
to have the opportunity to win a high value product. Following this idea and exploiting the 
customers cooperation, online store created a new selling strategy in order to provide the best 
price to customers. This mechanism is provided by new-born websites that typically sell 
technological products. These websites are not the producers, but they purchase products from 
several companies and only act as intermediaries for the customers. The reason can be found in 
the fact that nowadays most people are able to look for products information by themselves, 
without a salesman aid, for example looking directly at the producer’s website or from online 
newspaper articles or blogs. It means that customers are able to collect information about the 
product at a certain moment and then, in a second one, to choose where to buy it at the best 
price. With this new practice, customers are able to purchase a product with a discounted price 
generally up to a third of the “advised” price, i.e. the price imposed by the producer company 
to end users. This discount is possible because one product is dispatched only if a determined 
number N of customers pays the product price, creating a waiting list. In this case, the term 
“group purchase” would not be correct. In fact, in a group purchase, all the customers pay the 
same price to buy a product and all the members receive the good at the same time. The time 
aspect is lost in the case of this new selling strategy: in fact, customers receive the good on a 
chronological basis, because they have to wait for new customers orders. So, if the first 
customer pays the price, he has to wait that the specified number N of new customers performs 
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the payment. In this case, the price assumes the characteristic of a reservation fee, but without 
the certainty of the delivery of the product. In this way, the website collects the necessary 
amount of money to buy and then to sell the product to the first customer. In the same way, the 
second customer has to wait other N new customers in order to receive the product. The website 
is able to make profit because the cost of buying the product is lower than the value of the N 
payments received from customers. These last ones gain in the sense that they are able to save 
money because they can buy a product paying only a portion (on average one third) and relying 
on other customers who made their payment. It seems to be a win-win strategy. However, 
customers have to consider the waiting time. In fact, since each shipped product require N 
customers, the waiting list become gradually longer and so the time that new customers, at the 
end of the list, have to wait. So, this is the first downside and the second one is correlated to it. 
As the list become longer day by day, a new customer is discouraged to add his order to the list 
for one basic motive: he does not know how many other customers will join to the list. So, he 
has two possible future scenarios: 
- a sufficient number of customers will join to the list, allowing him to receive the product 
but, at the time he joins the list, the exact waiting time is unknown; 
- not enough customers will join the list and he has to redeem the product at a total price 
higher than the “advised” price (if the website provides this practice). 
Due to the characteristics of the mechanism used by these new websites, it can be considered a 
matrix scheme. But, a crucial point has to be explained. At a first glance, the matrix scheme 
could differ from this new selling strategy. In fact, matrix scheme customers accept the low 
value product price and by buying it they can be considered “satisfied”, while the high value 
product is only a possible extra. Instead, in this new selling strategy there is only one product 
and the customers are “satisfied” only when they find the required number of new members. 
However, the price of the low value product and the relation between the two kinds of product 
have to be analysed. In fact, if the product that the customers purchase has very little value, it 
could be said that the high value product is not only the reward, but it is the real sold product. 
It means that if the low value product would not be sold without the high value product, this 
last one is the real product that customers desired and want to buy. Given that, the matrix 
scheme shows a structure that is quite equal to the new selling strategy. If matrix scheme 
customers purchase the low value products only to join the list in order to obtain the high value 
one, this last one can be considered in the same way as the price (or fee) that customers pay in 
the websites which use this new strategy. Indeed, the low value product of the matrix scheme 
can be considered as a simple fee that the customers pay in order to join the waiting list, which 
is exactly the same system provided by the new considered websites. The low value product in 
 8   
this way can be ignored and these two schemes coincide. However, due to lack of the presence 
of the low value product (even if it can be ignored), this new selling strategy can be considered 
as a peculiar variant of the classical matrix scheme. 
The table below shows an example of a waiting list. Orders are recorded chronologically and 
each order, but the first, is assigned to an older one, as the “referral code” column shows. In 
this table, the assumption is that each order needs three new orders to be completed. The first 
order has no referral code because there is no older order to be associated with. The second, 
third and fourth has the same referral code and it coincide with the first order. It means that 
these three orders payment are used to dispatch the product of the first order. So, order A has a 
3/3 state because there are three orders after it, as well as order B. It means that they can receive 
the product. Instead, order C has only one order assigned to it and has to wait two further 
customers in order to be completed and receive the product. All other orders have a 0/3 state 
and have to wait three new customers each. 
 
Table 1 - Example of waiting list 
Place Date Order Referral code State 
1 1st January A - 3/3 
2 2nd January B A 3/3 
3 3rd January C A 1/3 
4 4th January D A 0/3 
5 5th January E B 0/3 
6 6th January F B 0/3 
7 7th January G B 0/3 
8 8th January H C 0/3 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two examples of the websites that use this strategy. In the first screen, 
there are three product which are examples of what these websites sell. Moreover, on the left 
of this screen, there is a list of all categories of products. These are mainly technological goods 
as TVs, videogames, smartphone, PCs but also fashion accessories and gift vouchers. Products 
prices are already at the discounted value as it can be seen by the prepaid MasterCard with a 
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value of 100€ but a price of 49€ for the customer. In the second screen, there are three examples 
of notebooks and in this case the website illustrates the discounted price and the gross one. 
Notebooks profile recall one of the concept introduced in previous paragraph. In fact, customers 
need only the product code contained in the product name in order to look for characteristics 
and information autonomously, without a salesman aid. 
 
Figure 1 - Website 1 example 
 
 
Figure 2 - Website 2 example 
 
Figure 3 shows the screen of a product taken as example. In the picture, there are some 
information that are considerably important for customers. In fact, it is written that a customer 
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has the possibility to obtain the purchase refund if it is requested within 15 days from the order 
payment, following the Italian “costumer code” law. Then, if these days are spent, a customer 
has two possibilities: 
- to wait three referral codes to obtain the product at the price initially paid; 
- to not wait and to obtain the product paying the residual amount on the basis of referral 
codes found. 
So, in this second case, the website shows for each product three amounts a customer is obliged 
to pay if he wants to obtain the products before having found three referral codes. With a simple 
calculation, it easy to show that if a customer wants to redeem the product with no referral code 
it will pay a higher price than the gross one indicated by the website. In the case of the screen 
with no referral code, a customer should add 406€ to the 170€ already paid with a total of 576€. 
This amount is higher than the 510€, which is the full (or gross) price of the website. The reason 
is the website profit. If the price to redeem the product with no referral code was the difference 
between gross price and discounted one, the website’s profits would decrease. In fact, since the 
price paid by the customer is assigned to another older order, a customer with no referral code 
has to add the amount that the website needs in order to buy the product entirely. In this case, 
website needs 406€ in order to buy and then sell the product, so the difference between 510€ 
and 170€ (340€) is not sufficient.  
 
Figure 3 - Product profile 
 
It’s useful to consider also a numerical example. Assuming that a new customer joins an 
existing list, which already has three waiting clients on it. So, there are three old customers, 
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called subject Alfa, Beta and Gamma, and one new customer, called Delta. All these individuals 
paid a price of 300€ for the “chance” to obtain a product, with an “advised price” of 900€ and 
a cost of 800€ for the website. Before Delta joins the list, the website collected the price paid 
by Alfa, Beta and Gamma. However, the fee paid by the very first client of the list can be 
considered entirely as a profit for the website. So, the website collected 300€ from Alfa that are 
full profit, and a total of 600€ by Beta and Gamma. This last amount of money will be used by 
the website in order to purchase first and sell after the product to Alfa, so his order can be 
considered “completed”. But Alfa’s order lack one of the three further orders. So, when subject 
Delta joined the list, the website collected another fee and with this last one it is able to ship the 
first product to Alfa. So now the situation is the following: 
- subject Alfa paid 300€ and received the product; 
- subject Beta paid 300€ and he has to wait three other customers, after Delta; 
- subject Gamma paid 300€ and he has to wait three further customers, after the three ones 
that subject Beta has to wait; 
- subject Delta paid 300€ and he has to wait three further customers, after the three ones that 
subject Gamma has to wait; 
- website collect 300€ for each of the four players, with a total cost of 800€, gaining a profit 
of 400€. 
In this case, the website gains 300€ from the first player, and 100€ for each product that is able 
to dispatch. The scheme shows that actually one subsequent order has the task to cover partially 
the cost of the item for one of previous order. The portion that this order is able to cover depends 
on the number of orders that website require in order to dispatch one product. In this case each 
order covers one third of the cost of an item. 
The Italian situation shows the presence of few websites which used this selling strategy, with 
three different mechanism. The example explained above is clear but is limited in the sense that 
these kinds of websites sell several products with various prices and it has to be specified in 
order to distinguish between different methodologies. In the first mechanism, there is the 
creation of as many waiting lists as many the product types. So, if there are three different 
products, X, Y and Z, each of this product has a different list with a total of three list. The 
second system can be considered a variation of the first one because orders of one list could 
“help” another list of a product with a lower price (in order to preserve the profit for the 
website). So, if X, Y and Z prices are such that X < Y < Z and the price of Y is slightly bigger 
than the X one, website could set that the order of Y will be used to dispatch product X. It 
means that a new order on the Y list can be used to dispatch a product of list X or Y. Normally, 
websites rely on the chronological order so new orders will be used to ship previous ones on 
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the basis of the older order made. In the third mechanism, there is a unique list and it works as 
a “compensation” system. It means that if there are, as before, three different products, they 
will join the same unique list. The prices paid by new customers will be used to dispatch 
previous orders whatever is the product. Even in this case a numerical example is helpful. 
Suppose that there are three products: product X with a price of 100€, Y with a price of 300€, 
Z with a price of 500€. The first order is for product X, the second one for Y, the third one for 
Z and each product requires three times the price in order to be dispatched. So, the first customer 
makes an order of product X paying 100€ and he needs 300€ in order to obtain the product. The 
second customer makes a product Y order paying 300€. This amount is used in order to dispatch 
the first order because the required amount match the paid amount. However, the second 
customer needs 900€ in order to have the product. The third customer makes a product Z order 
paying 500€ and he will need 1500€ to obtain his product. The amount he paid is used to cover 
partially the required amount of the second customer, that is 900€. So, at the end of day, the 
first customer obtained his product, the second one collected 500€ but he needs 400€ more so 
he has to wait for new customers, as well as the third customer. Actually, some websites use 
this third mechanism combined with the first one, creating a sort of fourth mechanism. It means 
that a new order payment is used to cover partially the older order, whichever is, and partially 
the older order of the same product.  
The correlation between advantages and downside lies in the trade-off between numbers of 
customers and waiting time. The third mechanism has the benefit to attract a larger number of 
people: when a customer has to decide whether to join the list or not he has to consider a unique 
list and he knows that all possible future orders can help his order. But, by doing so, the waiting 
list become quickly bigger, consequently boosting the time that new customers have to wait, 
discouraging them. It means that each new customer increases the waiting time for all the 
following ones. For this reason, the fourth method has been created in order to decrease this 
time. Instead, the first and second mechanism can rely on a smaller effect of a new customer 
because there are several lists each for a product. So, in this case a new customer can rely only 
on future orders of the same product. However, the benefit is that the list takes more time, with 
respect to third mechanism, to become long enough to discourage new customers.  
Whichever is the mechanism used, the website will have a proportion of about 1:3 between 
completed orders and waiting customers. This is due to the fact that approximately customers 
are able to purchase products at a price equal to one third of the “advised” price. 
For this reason, it seems that these websites apply an up to date form of a matrix (and pyramid) 
scheme. It is characterized by the fact that among all the customers only a minority can succeed 
to normally gain profits or, in this case, obtain products, at the expense of all the other customers 
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that represent the majority. In the next paragraph the most common forms of pyramid scheme 
will be analysed in order to highlight characteristics, similarities and differences with respect 
to the mechanism applied by the websites in analysis. 
 
 
1.3 Comparison with other similar schemes 
 
The relation between one dispatched product and a predefined number of paid prices leads to 
presume that this mechanism is nothing but a pyramid scheme, as explained above. So, in this 
paragraph some type of schemes will be discussed in order to understand whether these new 
selling strategies3 can be equated to one of them. These schemes are: pyramid scheme, Ponzi 
scheme, multi-level marketing and referral programs. 
 
 
1.3.1 Pyramid scheme 
 
The mechanism of pyramid scheme is based on the promise to customers or investors, by paying 
an upfront fee, to gain large profits if they are able to recruit other people to join this system. 
This means that the source of revenues is the recruitment of people itself, and not the real return 
on the investment or the revenues from the sale of goods and services. A probability model of 
a pyramid scheme is explained by J. L. Gastwirth (1977). His model provides the following 
results: 
- the majority of the participants have less than 10% probability to recover the initial 
investment when a small profit is achieved as soon as three people are recruited; 
- on average, about the 50% of the participants will not be able to recruit new members and 
will lose all the investment; 
- on average, about the 12.5% of the participants will recruit three or more members; 
- less than 1% of the participants can expect to recruit six or more new members. 
To better understand how this mechanism works and how it differentiates from the other ones, 
it is useful to present a numerical example. Suppose that there are four types of subject: one 
promoter, the principal investor, few successful investor and several victims. An example of 
this type of scheme is illustrated as follows: each investor has to pay 500€ to the promoter and 
has to enlarge the pyramid by recruiting three more members, who in turn have to do the same. 
                                               
3 In the following pages, the terms “scheme in analysis” is used in order to refer to the new selling strategy. 
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The revenues accruing to the promoter derive from all members payments of 500€ while 
participants earnings are the result of two sources: a payment of 150€ received from the 
promoter for each player he’s able to recruit at the first level and an additional payment of 30€ 
for each new member that join the scheme in the next three levels. 
 
Table 2 - Pyramid scheme example 
Promoter 
Principal investor Level 0  
Successful 
investors 
Level 1 150€ x 3 = 450€ 1 x 1 x 1 x 
Level 2 30€ x 9 = 270€ 3 x 3 x 3 x 
Victims 
Level 3 30€ x 27 = 810€ 9 x 9 x 9 x 
Level 4 30€ x 81 = 2430€ 27 x 27 x 27 x 
 Level 0 total gain: 3960€ Members: 121 
 
 
This table represents the construction of the pyramid and for calculation purpose it is assumed 
that the scheme collapses after level 4. Level 0 investor revenues derive from the commission 
that he receives for each new recruitment: 150€ for each member at level 1 and 30€ for each 
member from level 2 to 4. It seems a good investment because he can gain 3960€ by paying a 
500€ fee. Each of the three level 1 investors gains 150€ for the three members at the level 
immediately below and 30€ for each member at level 3 and 4: each of them gains 1530€ with 
a 500€ fee. Proceeding with the calculation it is clear that this scheme results in a loss for the 
level 3 investors: in fact, they can rely on only three 150€ commissions so they obtain 450€ by 
paying 500€, resulting in a 50€ loss. This situation can be enlarged to the level 4 investors 
because they lose the entire 500€ they “invested”. Part of their losses contribute to generate 
promoter profits. He gains: 500€ from the first investor, 350€ from the three investors at level 
1 (500€ minus 150€ commission), 320€ from the nine ones at level 2 (500€ minus 150€ and 
30€ commissions), 290€ from the twenty-seven members at level 3 (500€ minus 150€, 30€ and 
30€), 260€ from the new eighty-one investors at level 4 (500€ minus 150€, 30€, 30€ and 30€). 
The total sum of these value lead to a result of 33,320€ net profit for the promoter. This example 
assumed that the pyramid collapses after level 4. In reality, however, this is unknown for the 
majority of investors. A level 4 investor may think to be at the top (or close to it) of the pyramid 
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when he joins the scheme but, after the scheme collapse, he realizes that he is actually at the 
bottom, as level 3 investors. So, among the 121 members joining the scheme, there are 108 who 
suffer losses. 
Pyramid scheme create an ethical issued, in fact they are largely considered unethical, as 
explained by D. Koehn (2001). She sustains that pyramid schemes are unethical for two 
reasons: they are fraudulent and recruitment-centred businesses.  
The first point derives from the fact that they typically promised high rate of return with a small 
investment. In fact, the system implies that the early adopter of this scheme can make a great 
investment, but at the expenses of those who comes later, who will make little gain or even lose 
money because there are no other people to recruit. 
The second point is related to the fact that is not in the public interest to have business who are 
recruitment-centred because of two motives. First, a company should focus on the marketing 
of “non-harmful products” to customers. Otherwise it would mean that a company is 
concentrated on making money “per se”, but this is not a public interest. Second, a company 
should be concentrate its effort on growing through developing the market for its product and 
not on the growth “per se”. Then, it is necessary to evaluate whether a company aims at: 
- making profits with the development, the sales and the advertising of a non-harmful 
products, 
- growing thanks to the enlargement of the customers base by offering new products. 
Several aspects of a company tell that a company and its agents are recruitment-centred 
schemes. Even if they are not thorough, they are: 
- the focus on growth through recruitment of new adherent, 
- the request of considerable upfront fees, 
- the pressure on recruits to purchase for consumption. 
 
 
1.3.2 Ponzi scheme 
 
Pyramid and Ponzi schemes share some characteristics, but it is not possible to consider them 
identical. In a Ponzi scheme, there is one schemer and several victims. The schemer is the 
individual who creates and manages the scheme while all the investors are the victims: the latter 
do not know that profits are generated by new investor payments; instead they believe that the 
schemer is a capable investor. The schemer acts as the principal actor because he manages all 
payments from and to investors. This scheme provides quite high return on investment, so first 
investors that achieve this gain are incentivized to invest more money into the project. In this 
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way, the scheme’s life is extended: the schemer and early investor reach their profit. However, 
this kind of scheme persists if fund’s money output rate is lower than the one of money 
deposited by new investors. When the output rate is larger than the input one, the scheme starts 
to collapse.  
Copious is the doctrine about this type of scheme because of his seniority, as explained by U. 
Bhattacharya (2001). His study is focused on the promoter sales of certificates with a price 𝑃 
to a mass 𝑛' of citizens, promising a return of 𝑟. At maturity, the promoter redeems the 
certificates, but he sells a new batch of them at the same conditions to a mass of citizen equal 
to 𝑛) = (1 + 𝑔)𝑛', 
where 𝑔 > 𝑟. The last round is the round 𝐿. The variables introduced so far are endogenous so 
decided by the promoter. The promoter revenues are equal to 𝑛'𝑃 in the first round, plus a 
portion 𝑡 of the next rounds revenues. The revenues collected in one round are used to pay the 
return to previous round citizens, then (1 − 𝑡)𝑃𝑛4 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃𝑛4(1 + 𝑔) must be equal to 𝑃(1 + 𝑟)𝑛45). It means that 𝑡 is equal to 𝑡 = 657)86. So, the promoter expected revenues are: 𝜋 = 𝑛'𝑃 + :𝑔 − 𝑟1 + 𝑔; <(1 − 𝜃)4𝑛4𝑃 +⋯+ (1 − 𝜃)?𝑛?𝑃@, 
where (1 − 𝜃)4 is the probability of survival of the Ponzi scheme till round 𝐿. In fact, 𝜃 is the 
probability that the regulator may intervene to stop this practice. 
The cost that the promoter faces are the direct marketing expenses and the penalty imposed by 
the regulator if the scheme collapse. The marketing cost are a distinctive feature of the Ponzi 
scheme. In fact, the promoter bears only an initial amount of this type of cost: after the first 
amount of successful payment to investors, information about this scheme spread among 
investors (word of mouth) without or with negligible further marketing expenses by the 
promoter. When a circumstance of this type happens, i.e. marketing costs do not increase as the 
number of rounds, the system has to be recognized as a Ponzi scheme. The marketing theory 
on the effectiveness of marketing expenses, Rao and Miller (1975) provides strong evidence of 
this reasoning. 
The participation constraint of the promoter is given by the comparison between the choice to 
run away and the termination in round 𝐿. The promoter always faces the desire to run away 
with the money before the last round. In this case, if the promoter terminates in a round 𝑖, he 
gets revenues equal to 𝑡𝑃𝑛4. While if he terminates in the next round 𝑖 + 1, he gains revenues 
of (1 − 𝜃)𝑡𝑃𝑛48), equal to (1 − 𝜃)𝑡𝑃(1 + 𝑔)𝑛4. To ensure that it is optimal for the promoter 
to wait until the last round (i.e. Ponzi scheme is a subgame-perfect equilibrium), the latter 
expected revenues should be greater than the former: 
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(1 − 𝜃)𝑡𝑃(1 + 𝑔)𝑛4 > 𝑡𝑃𝑛4. 
This inequality gives the lower bound of the promoter participation constraint on 𝑔: 𝑔 ≥ DEFD. 
The participation of citizens is solved backwards. If in the last round, citizens know that there 
will be no bailout from the government in the case of the scheme collapse, they will not 
participate, repeating this choice in all previous round and none of the citizens would 
participate. Then, the promoter in the last should in involve at least a sufficient number of 
people that obliged the government to implement the bailout, i.e. 𝑛? ≥ 𝑛∗ where 𝑛∗ is the 
critical mass of citizens. This means that Ponzi schemes do not exist if the probability of a 
bailout is zero. However, this does not imply that Ponzi schemes necessarily exist of the bailout 
probability is positive. In fact, if the probability of bailout exist, citizens has to evaluate whether 
to participate or not. If the they participate in the last round, they gain:  −𝑃 + 𝛼(1/𝑛? − 1)𝛽, 
where 𝛼 are the government asset and 𝛽 is the probability of bailout. If they do not participate 
they bear a loss in any case equal to −𝛼𝛽, 
which is the expected loss due to the redistribution of the government assets. Citizens 
participate if the former is greater than the former:  −𝑃 + 𝛼(1/𝑛? − 1)𝛽 ≥ −𝛼𝛽. 
This inequality solution provides a condition for the price:  𝑃 ≤ L#M 𝛽. 
This explanation provides an essential point: if citizens participate, they lose, but they lose less 
than what they would if they did not participate. It means that is rational for a citizen to 
participate in the last round, whether the loss deriving by not participating is greater than the 
one deriving by the participation. For this reason, governments are interested in stop this 
scheme to born and/or spread. 
Therefore, a Ponzi scheme may exist if: 
-  the assets (𝛼) of the state can be used for the bailout (𝛽), 
- the probability of early termination of the scheme by the regulator is low (𝜃), 
- there is an inexpensive access to citizens through mass media, 
- there are no severe penalties on the promoter. 
However, no government has ever compensated of the entire loss the citizens who were victims 
of Ponzi schemes. The money that participating citizens lose are equal to 𝑃, which is equal to L#M 𝛽, while the net bailout is 𝛼(1/𝑛? − 1). Therefore, the portion of money lost which is rescue 
by the bailout is:  
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𝛿 = L()/#∗5))LO/#∗ = )5#∗O . 
A partial bailout implies that 𝛿 < 1, so 𝛽 < 1 − 𝑛∗. Then, a Ponzi scheme may exist even under 
partial bailout if the conditions just listed hold and if the probability of bailout is higher than (1 − 𝑛∗), where 𝑛∗ is the critical fraction of citizens that are required to be involved in order 
that a possibility of bailout exists. 
This elaboration demonstrates that: 
- citizens believe that they could achieve a higher expected return without taking the 
corresponding risk, 
- a promoter exploits the belief of a bailout of the citizens in order to convince them to 
participate the scheme. 
The table 3 illustrates an extremely simplified example of the Ponzi scheme functioning. 
Differently from the pyramid scheme, in this case it is better to consider the input and output 
of money (chronologically) rather than the number of investor that deposit money. The output 
column is calculated assuming a 10% interest rate. The residual is the difference between the 
output and the input in the next period. Then, it is easy to calculate that this scheme works until 
there are enough input of money to compensate the output level of the previous period. 
  
Table 3 - A simple example of a Ponzi scheme 
Time Input Output Residual 
T 100 € 110 € 90 € 
T+1 200 € 220 € 170 € 
T+2 300 € 330 € - 60 € 
T+3 100 € 110 € . . . 
 
 
The investor in time T deposits an amount of 100€ and he expects to gain a total of 110€ because 
of the 10% interest rate. This amount can only be compensated with new deposits of investors. 
In the example, it is assumed that it is equal to 200€, higher than the output of previous period 
that the schemer has to pay. The difference between input and output is the residual amount in 
the schemer current account. The investment in time T+1 results in an output of 220€, 
considering the interest rate. It can be paid only with a new investment in the next period, T+2. 
Similarly, the input is greater than the output of the previous round so the schemer is able to 
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repay it with a residual in his favour of 170€. This value is equal to the first residual of 90€ plus 
the second residual of 80€ (300€ - 220€). This example starts to collapse in period T+3. In fact, 
the schemer in this period has a current account equal to 270€, that is the value of the input in 
time T+3 and the residual amount after the output of time T+1. This value (270€) is not 
sufficient to compensate the output of time T+2 equal to 330€. So, the schemer is in a default 
situation because there is not enough input to pay the output to investors. 
Whether the amount of input is larger than the amount of output, the schemer is able to repay 
the investment with the interest rate. However, this mechanism requires a level of input always 
greater than the one of the previous period. Normally, the schemer capable of persuade old 
investors to deposit again their money is essential for the scheme life because he should only 
pay the interest rate and not the entire amount. This scheme collapses for several reasons. The 
most common are the escape of the promoter or if a great number of investors in few time 
require their deposit back which is greater than the amount that the promoter owns.  
 
 
1.3.3 Multi-level marketing 
 
The so-called multi-level marketing is a third type of scheme and it relies on the goods sale. In 
this case, there are three types of subjects:  
- the parent company which produce the good,  
- the salesmen, 
- non-participant customers.  
The business model is build up as follows: the parent company provides products to the 
salesmen who have two tasks: to sell them to non-participant customers and simultaneously to 
undertake promotional activities. In this way, the parent company decrease its marketing costs 
after the initial period. Additionally, salesman can build their “downline” of distributors. It 
means that a distributor can convince other people to become distributor as well, by expanding 
the organization.  It is a possibility for the distributor, but it is also an obliged step in order to 
increase his income. In fact, a distributor’s revenues derive from: 
- his actual sales, 
- a percentage of the sales of his downline. 
However, salesman cannot rely on a monthly or periodic certain wage because all distributor’s 
revenues are made up of commissions paid by the parent company. The first are commissions 
paid on the basis of the salesman direct sales while the second are commissions derived from 
the sales of the distributors that constitute the downline. Then, the company is able to make 
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large profit because of the goods sale provided by the salesmen and because these last ones are 
remunerated only on a commission basis. The possibility of the distributor to build his own 
downline of salesman shapes the pyramid scheme of this business model. In fact, each salesman 
has to recruit new agents in order to increment his revenues because in this way he can exploit 
revenues made by someone else effort. This mechanism guarantees sure revenues to the 
company and to the salesmen at the very top of the pyramid; on the other hand, the scenario is 
negative for all other members. In this case the pyramid concept has to be considered differently 
than before, in fact each salesman considers the pyramid that he is able to build, with himself 
at the summit. So, if in the classic pyramid scheme and in the Ponzi one, the scheme collapses 
once and for everyone, the multi-level marketing can collapse continuously several times and 
it involves different members in different periods. Then, the relation between salesman and 
customers has to be considered. In fact, theoretically customers should be merely end-user, but 
in the practice, consumers are new members recruited by salesmen positioned above in the 
structure. At the end of the day, the majority of participants are unable to make profits because 
of two reasons: they become real seller and have to sustain operating expenses and then each 
person of the pyramid can quit the system at any time, cutting other salesmen revenues. This 
statement is demonstrated by studies on MLM companies. The result is that about 60% to 90% 
of participants quit the scheme and that the 99% of workforce are unable to make profits. The 
majority of people are convinced by the value of the profits made by few members at the top, 
believing that at a certain point in the future they will be at the summit of the pyramid gaining 
the same profits. Then, they discovered that this option will be not verified so they quit the 
scheme but in the meanwhile they contributed to company profits by consuming products and 
by recruiting more workforce. However, there are some feature that split the multi-level 
marketing company in legal or illegal. The legal multi-level marketing plan is characterized by: 
- business focus on the sales of product to end-user, 
- the profits derived primarily by the sales of the distributor, 
- generally, products are typically used in everyday life with a good quality-price ratio, 
- there is low or none start-up cost, 
- the support system is characterized by a low pressure and by the desire to answer all possible 
questions with all the required information, 
- the company provides detailed information about the job and it does not promise easy 
money, 
- it is easy and without cost to quit the company, 
- the business is sustainable. 
So, the profits of distributor are based on the time and effort committed to the sales activities. 
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Opposite is the case of an illegal MLM plan because the business focus is on the recruitment of 
new members. They are also obliged to pay an initial fee which will be used to pay older 
distributor. The support system is focused on a constantly recruiting activity and the company 
promises large profits with low effort. Then, distributors are discouraged to quit the company 
because of the high-pressure tactic on keeping participants within the scheme. At the end, this 
system fate is the collapse, causing a loss of money for the majority of the salesman. 
Multi-level marketing is not considered illegal in advance, but it depends on the methodologies 
that the specific company uses in order to develop it. 
 
 
1.3.4 Referral programs 
 
One peculiarity of the variant of the matrix scheme in analysis (and also of other systems) is 
the recruitment and this aspect reminds the so-called referral programs. This kind of programs 
can be considered as a marketing strategy. In fact, the aim of it is to use the most ancient 
advertisement form in order to increase revenues: the word of mouth. The mechanism is simple: 
a customer has the opportunity to obtain discounts, prizes and rewards if he is able to lead a 
new client to purchase the company product. This is called referral program because a new 
client can buy the product with the reference of an older customer. It is a form of decentralized 
advertisement because not only the company promote the product but also customers are 
involved in the marketing strategy and they have to look for new customers in order to obtain 
rewards. A customer in a referral program has two options: to look for a new customer or not. 
It means that he has the possibility to obtain a reward if he finds another customer to activate 
the referral program but if it does not happen the customer has no negative effect. So, the 
recruitment is an extra option for the actual customers that can decide to exploit it or not.  
An example of a referral program can be the following. A customer has a valuation V of a 
product that costs P. His utility function is given by: 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 𝑃. In order to exploit the benefit 
of this program, a person has to be already a customer. It means that a customer has accepted 
the price and obtained the product. In this way, the customer utility is positive or at least zero. 
By adhering to the program, a customer has a possibility to gain a benefit 𝛼 if he is able to 
“bring” a new customer to the company. Then, this new customer paid the price (if he considers 
it equivalent or lower than the valuation) and give the old customer the possibility to gain a 
positive utility. In fact, by considering 𝛼, the new utility is 𝑈 = (𝑉 − 𝑃) + 𝛼. Since the 
difference between V and P must be positive (otherwise a rational customer would not have 
paid), the final utility is at least equal to 𝛼. For ease, it can be assumed that the effort on the 
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research of a single new customer (relative, friend, colleague) is very low, or null, compared to 
the benefit. In the case the cost is higher than the benefit, a customer would not accept this 
program but normally is not. For this reason, normally this program implies that a customer 
should convince only another one and the company tries to make this practice easy. In fact, the 
new customer has only to report the “referral code” on the form (for this reason the name 
referral program). Generally, this program implies also a benefit for the new customer in order 
to convince him, or otherwise, he has the same possibility to exploit the benefit using the same 
practice with another new customer. In this way, the company has the cost of providing the 
benefit but not the advertising cost because all the process is possible with the word-of-mouth 
principle. 
 
 
1.3.5 Differences among schemes 
 
Pyramid and Ponzi schemes are similar because in both older investors’ profits are generated 
by fees paid by new investors, and not by business or financial activities. However, the strategy 
and actors are different. In the pyramid case, actors know that commissions derive from the 
recruitment of new investors, while in the Ponzi one, they do not because they believe that 
earnings derive from the ability of a capable investor. Then, since the schemer manages all the 
process it could be said that the scheme is centralized in his figure while the pyramid scheme 
is characterized by the decentralization. In fact, each investor has the duty to recruit new ones 
in order to gain commissions. A third difference lies on the possible duration that is general 
longer for a Ponzi scheme. In fact, in this case the schemer can rely on payments of actual 
investor by persuading them, shifting forward the collapse. In the pyramid scheme, this is not 
possible because actual investors require necessarily new ones. The scheme in analysis (i.e. the 
new selling strategy) share characteristics of both pyramid and Ponzi schemes but it differs in 
other aspects. As these two cases, the crucial activity derives from the recruitment of new 
members even if the subject designated to do it is different. For this aspect, the scheme in 
analysis is more similar to the pyramid case where all members have to recruit other ones. 
Conversely, instead, happens in the Ponzi scheme where only the creator has the task of looking 
for new investors because only he knows that new members are necessary to satisfy older ones’ 
contracts. Then, also the purpose is different. In fact, pyramid and Ponzi schemes are both 
considered financial “activities” because the investors purpose is to make profits. This aspect 
is not the same of the scheme in analysis. Indeed, its purpose is to allow people to purchase 
consumption goods (at a discounted price). A further element is the number of times a member 
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can act within the scheme. The scheme in analysis allows people to made multiple purchases, 
as it occurs in the Ponzi scheme where actual members can add money to the investment, but 
differently from the pyramid scheme where exclusively new members are needed. 
So, considered these characteristics, the scheme in analysis could look more similar to a 
pyramid scheme than a Ponzi scheme. In fact, the only aspect similar to this last one is the 
recruitment, while all other aspects are different. However, an important trait distinguishes the 
scheme in analysis and the pyramid (and Ponzi) scheme. In fact, none of these two are based 
on a goods sale. Even if in the Ponzi scheme investors are buying a financial product because 
they invest money in order to make future profit, when the scheme is revealed or collapse they 
discover that no financial product has ever existed.  
The MLM shares the actual sale of goods with the scheme in analysis but they differ for the 
purpose and for one aspect of the pyramid structure. In fact, the MLM purpose from the point 
of view of participants is to make profits, while in the scheme in analysis it is the purchase of 
discounted products. Then, the pyramid concept is slightly different. In fact, in the scheme in 
analysis a member has to consider only the level immediately below him and when he obtains 
the required number of people he has no more work to do. In the MLM a member has to consider 
not only the few recruited members but he has to continuously monitor and manage the entire 
pyramid of members that he recruited. In fact, a salesman can gain if his recruited members sell 
and convince other members to join the pyramid. But, he bears the risk of losing revenues if 
recruited members quit. So, on one hand, in the matrix scheme variant, a member is satisfied 
when he finds the required members, on the other hand, in the MLM, a member has to be 
continuously active in order to gain and to delay “his” pyramid collapse. Given that, there are 
more differences that similarities between these two systems, so it is difficult to consider the 
scheme in analysis as a multi-level marketing.  
Referral program mechanism seems to be quite equal to the scheme in analysis: there is the 
same decentralized marketing activity by customers and they obtain discounts only if they are 
able to lead to purchase new clients. However, there is an important aspect that distinguishes 
the referral program with respect to the scheme in analysis. In the former, a customer already 
obtained the product, i.e. he has already purchased the product at a certain price and he is 
obtaining additional gains out of it thank to the referral program, in terms of rewards or 
discounts on future products. In the latter, a customer has to look for new members in order to 
obtain the product, without them he has nothing. Then, the situation is different because, in the 
matrix scheme variant, the recruitment is preparatory in order to obtain the product. A customer 
has no option but to recruit a certain number of people otherwise he is not able to catch the 
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desired product. Due to this important difference between referral programs and the scheme in 
analysis it can be said that they are not the same thing. 
Concluding, this new selling strategy implies the creation of a waiting list which determine the 
structure of a pyramid scheme. However, due to the mechanism, nature or purpose, the selling 
strategy cannot overlap perfectly to none of the schemes explained above. The case that best 
describes the functioning of this new selling strategy remains the matrix scheme, as discussed 
in the paragraph 1.2. Then, this new practice can be considered as a variant of the pure matrix 
scheme. 
 
 
1.4 Legal issue 
 
In several states, these various types of pyramidal sales or schemes are considered illegal. The 
reason is the social damage caused by this type of mechanism. In fact, history shows that this 
“company” caused a damage to several citizens/investors/customers. Then, due to the focus of 
the company on the recruitment of other members, the aim is not to offer products or services 
to the public but only to collect revenues with upfront fees. All the activity described above are 
considered illegal because they caused an economic damage for a significant number of 
citizens, who normally lost money. The most famous and recent case is Madoff investment 
scandal. Madoff managed a Ponzi scheme for several years. It collapsed alongside with the 
financial crisis in 2008 because major investors withdrew the money they had in the fund, but 
its current account was not sufficient. Madoff caused a shortage of 65 billion dollar, owned by 
citizens and financial institution. 
In Italy, the pyramid sales are expressly disciplined by the law no. 173/2005. This clause forbids 
the promotion or realization of all the sales structure in which the main economic incentive of 
the participants is based on the mere recruitment of new subjects, rather than on their capacity 
to sell or promote.  
Conversely, as explained in multi-level marketing paragraph, this scheme can be considered 
legal in some states (it is legal in all 50 U.S. states) if some features are respected. The key 
point is the focus of the company: whether it is the recruitment itself of new members, it is 
considered an unethical business. In fact, all customers, once they made their investment 
(except for the Ponzi scheme), want to shift the possible cost of the collapse to new members 
by recruiting them, creating a social problem.  
Even a company implementing the matrix scheme has been stopped by the UK Office of fair 
trading in 2005. The reason which explain this decision is given by the OFT Chairman, Vickers 
J.: “These schemes are unsustainable and will eventually collapse to the detriment of many 
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people. They can also undermine consumer confidence in e-commerce. The OFT's targeting of 
mass-marketed scams is an important part of its work of making markets work well for 
consumers”4. Therefore, the aim is to provide a genuine e-commerce, which does not cause 
economic or social losses for some people. In the previous paragraph, the selling strategy in 
analysis in considered like a matrix scheme, or a variant of it, due to the similar functioning 
concept. However, few differences exist and therefore it cannot be said whether also this new 
selling strategy should be considered illegal as well as the classical matrix scheme. 
  
                                               
4 Office of fair trading. 2005. Press release 161/05. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070314233701/http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2005/161-05 
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CHAPTER 2 
A MODEL WITH THREE ROUNDS 
 
 
2.1 The Model 
 
The realistic situation analysis of the sale with this peculiar variant of the matrix scheme 
requires a basic model in order to get an insight of this purchase system’s dynamics.  Therefore, 
in this and in the next chapters several variants of the same game will be analysed. These 
variants differ in the values of the parameters of the game. The aim is to replicate the real 
functioning and to comprehend the variables that can influence the game result. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to introduce some assumptions and to generalize some peculiarities that 
will shape the cases analysed further on.  
In the following games, the main parameters are: 
- a number N of rational and equal players/customers, 
- a number R of rounds, 
- a variable M which indicates the required number of payments which the customers have 
to perform in order to dispatch a product, 
- a product price P, 
- a product valuation V. 
Games have a number R of rounds. In each of them, one among N players is extracted. In each 
round, all players have the same possibility to be extracted, that is equal to ) S$ . This probability 
can have different explanation. In fact, it can be considered the probability that players have to 
gain access to the website before or faster than other players; or the probability to have 
knowledge of this method of purchase before other players. At the end of the day, it can look 
like a lottery in which all the participants have the same chance to be extracted. Once a player 
is selected, he has to decide whether to enter or not the game. If he does not, he does not pay 
and he receives nothing. If he participates, he pays a price P and has the opportunity to obtain 
the product with a value V. When the selected player takes his decision, the game moves to the 
next round with another “extraction”. The main “feature” of this type of purchase is the 
following: players don’t have the guarantee to get the product because they know that, in order 
to get one, a number M of prices has to be paid throughout R rounds, excluding the payment of 
the first player. It means that once a player pays the price, he is added to a waiting list that 
requires a number M of further payments in order to dispatch a product. For this reason, this 
parameter will be named “dispatch coefficient”. Generally, this parameter is helpful to 
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understand the portion of the product value of an older order that a subsequent one has to cover, 
as explained in paragraph 1.2. Then, the price P is the amount of money that a website asks in 
order to be added on the waiting list, while the valuation V is the amount of money that the 
product is worth from the customers point of view. Each player has a utility function as follows: 𝑢(𝑦) = 𝑉 − 𝑦𝑃, where y is the number of payments made by the player, at the end of all R 
rounds. This utility function assumed the “unit demand” concept. It means that if a player 
receives his product, he has no interest to enter the game again. All the equilibrium resulting 
from the analysis of the following cases are subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
In the following games, changes in variables are applied in order to understand the effect they 
have on the equilibrium from the players point of view. Then, the optimal seller’s profit is 
computed. In order to understand better the following paragraphs, some explanations are useful. 
The sentence “pay the price” is a synonym of “enter/participate the game”. The terms “receive”, 
“obtain” and “win” (a product) are used with the same sense in order to explain that a player 
has been satisfied with the product dispatch and he has no more interest in participating the 
game.  
 
 
2.2 Equilibrium analysis 
 
In the analysis of the following case, only the range in which 𝑉 > 𝑃 will be considered. The 
reason is that the range in which 𝑉 ≤ 𝑃 is trivial, whichever are the number of players, rounds 
and the dispatch coefficient required by the seller. 
If 𝑉 < 𝑃, players should pay a price which is greater than the value they attribute to the product, 
consequently none of the players is incentivized to enter the game. In fact, they would obtain 
for sure a negative utility equal to the difference between the value and price paid. For each 
value of P such that 𝑉 < 𝑃, all players will ignore the game, then choosing the “no” decision. 
As consequence, the seller is not able to achieve any positive profits.  
If 𝑉 = 𝑃, a player utility is apparently zero, so this case should provide a solution in which 
players enter the game, differently from previous case. However, without complex calculations, 
it is simple to understand that this game is not profitable for customers and the reason is 
straightforward. If the dispatch coefficient is equal to 1, it means a product needs a further 
payment by a customer in order to be shipped, and so on. The case equilibrium can be computed 
with certainty because all players will act in the same way in all rounds, independently by the 
state of the game. Using the backward induction technique, the starting point is round III, which 
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one player is extracted in. His decision is based on what happened in previous two rounds and 
there are two possibilities: he paid the price previously, so he is on the waiting list or he did 
not. The statement “being in the waiting list” means that a player has paid one price, but he 
needs another one to have the product dispatched. So, a player in this state paid the price in 
round I and nobody paid the price in round II or he paid the price only in round II. If a player 
extracted in round III is already on the waiting list, he should pay another time the price in order 
to have the price. But since 𝑉 = 𝑃, his utility function is 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃 = −𝑃. This result is 
equal to the utility he gains if he decides to not pay the price in round III because he does not 
receive product, but he pay one price: 𝑈 = 0 − 𝑃 = −𝑃. Opposite is the case in which he is not 
on the waiting list. He has no incentive to pay the price because he has no possibility to receive 
the product due to the lack of further round. Then the utility is 𝑈 = 0 − 𝑃 = −𝑃. If he does not 
pay the price, there is no variation in player wealth because he has a utility of zero. If he is on 
the waiting list, his utility is for sure –P, whichever his decision is. If he is not on the waiting 
list, his best strategy is to not enter the game, otherwise he would obtain a negative utility.  
Given that, in the second round, the same exact reasoning of round III can be done. Since 𝑉 =𝑃 and 𝑀 = 1, the marginal utility to enter the game is always –P. It means that does not matter 
the round, the player and the decision taken by other players in the past. Any player that decide 
to pay the price in any round obtains for sure a utility equal to –P whether he receive the product 
or not. For this reason, the solution of this case is equal to the previous one. All players decide 
to not enter the game. This behaviour is the same one of the first player extracted. Then, also in 
this case, none of the players will decide to pay the price and seller is unable to make profit.  
 
Only the case with a valuation V such that 𝑉 > 𝑃 should provide a positive solution both for 
players and the seller. In fact, only with this relationship between V and P, a player has incentive 
to enter the game and to pay the price. This case is called A in order to be compared with 
successive cases further on. It is characterized by N=3 players who have the opportunity to 
enter the game in R=3 rounds. In each round, players have to decide whether enter the game 
and pay a price P, or not to enter and paying nothing. In this game the dispatch coefficient is 
equal to 1. It means that a product requires one payment in order to be shipped, excluding the 
first payment. If two among three players pay the price, only the player that paid the price first 
obtain the product. An example is useful to explain this mechanism: a player in round I, who 
has paid the price, wins the product if a player in round II pays the same price. In turn, the 
player of round II wins the product if a player in round III pays the same price, and so on.  Each 
player has a probability of  	) Y$  to enter the game and has a utility function: 𝑢(𝑦) = 𝑉 − 𝑦𝑃. 
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In order to analyse this case equilibrium, it is necessary the backward induction technique, 
starting from the last round.  
 
Round III 
 
A player extracted in this round has incentive to enter the game only if: 
- he has already paid the price in one of previous two rounds, 
- by paying he is able to receive the product. 
Otherwise he will not enter the game since he will achieve a negative utility equal to the price. 
The analysis of next rounds will determine the optimal relations between V and P that lead 
players to enter the game.  
 
Round II 
 
When a player is extracted in round II, he faces three states of the game: 
- he paid the price in round I, 
- one of other players paid the price in round I, 
- nobody paid the price in round I. 
In the first state of the game, it is assumed that he already paid the price in the first round. Then, 
if he pays the price again in round II, he is able to obtain the product by paying two times the 
price with a utility of 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃. Otherwise, if he decides to not pay the price in round II, his 
payoff depends on what will happen in next round and on players behaviour. But, this is already 
explained above. In fact, it is said the in round III, only a player that entered the game in round 
I or II will decide to enter the game, otherwise he will not. Then, if the player in round II decide 
to not pay the price in round II, he expects to gain a utility of 𝑈 = −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃). The first 
addend is the result of the payment that this player made in round I. The second one is the 
probability to be extracted in round III and to pay the price. In order to estimate the optimal 
relationship between V and P that incentivize this player to enter the game in round II, these 
two utilities have to be compared. The resulting inequality is 𝑉 − 2𝑃 > −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃). By 
solving this inequality, the result is 𝑉 > 𝑃. Then, for all values of V such that 𝑉 > 𝑃, the utility 
that this player obtains in round II by entering the game is greater than the utility to not enter 
the game. In this case, all values of 𝑉 > 𝑃 are considered, then a player who is on the waiting 
list and who is extracted in round II will decide to pay the price in this round in any case. 
In the second state of the game, a player is extracted in round II but a different one paid the 
price in round I. If the player extracted in round II decides to pay the price in round II he bears 
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an outflow of P and has a possibility of 	) Y$  to be extracted again in next round in which he pays 
the price and obtains the products. Then, the utility of the decision to enter the game in round 
II is 𝑈 = −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃). In the case he decides to not pay the price in round II, his utility is 
given by his behaviour in round III, already explained above. So, since he did not pay the price 
in round I or II, he continues to not enter the game with a final utility equal to zero. In order 
that this player decides to pay the price in round II, the utility of entering the game has to be 
greater than the utility of not doing it. This inequality is −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) > 0 with a result of 𝑉 > 4𝑃. For all values that satisfy this inequality, a player that is extracted for the first time in 
round II decides to enter the game. 
The third state of the game can be considered equal to the second one. In fact, when a player is 
extracted the first time in round II, he does not consider what happened in the round I. If in the 
first round another player pay the price or if nobody pays the price, the player in round II has 
to consider only his utility starting from this round. Then, the utility to enter the game is 𝑈 =−𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃), while the utility to not do it is zero. As the second state of the game, for all 
value of V such that 𝑉 > 4𝑃, this player enters the game. 
In order to summarise the result, two cases have to be considered: 𝑉 > 4𝑃 and 𝑉 < 4𝑃. 
If 𝑉 > 4𝑃, the player extracted in round II enter the game in any case because with such value 
of V, the expected utility of entering the game is always greater than the utility to not enter it. 
If 𝑉 < 4𝑃, with this inequality, a player who is extracted for the first time in round II prefers 
to not enter the game because otherwise he would obtain a lower utility. Only the player who 
paid the price in round I, enter the game again in the second or third round, in order to receive 
the good. 
 
Round I 
 
The behaviour of a player in round I is analysed on the basis of the relationship between V and 
P just found. The first case is the one in which 𝑉 > 4𝑃. A player extracted in round I has to 
consider the expectations to obtain the product or not. If he pays the price in round I, a player 
has with certainty an outflow of P. In the second round, there are two options: he is extracted 
or not. His extraction has a probability of 	) Y$  and since 𝑉 > 4𝑃, it has been shows that the 
player enters the game also in the second round. If another player is extracted, this time with 
probability 	[ Y$ , the behaviour is the same. In fact, all players in round II in the case of 𝑉 > 4𝑃 
will enter the game. It means that a player who enters the game in round I will obtain with 
certainty the product. However, with 	) Y$  probability he pays the price twice, while with the 
residual 	[ Y$  he pays the price once. Then, the utility of a player that is extracted in round I is: 
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𝑈 = −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + 	[ Y$ 𝑉 = 	) Y$ (3𝑉 − 4𝑃). 
This result has to be compared with the utility that the player expects to gain if he does not pay 
the price in round I. This utility has been already calculated above when the players behaviour 
in round II was analysed. In fact, it has been said that with a value of V such that 𝑉 > 4𝑃, 
whoever is the player extracted, he pays the price with an expected utility of 𝑈 = −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 −𝑃). However, this utility occurs only with a utility of 	) Y$  because when player is in round I he 
has only 	) Y$  probability to gain this utility. With the remaining probability, he is unable to 
achieve the product. So, the complete utility is: 𝑈 = 	) Y$ [−𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] + 	[ Y$ (0) = 	) _$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃). 
The two utilities, one resulting from the player decision to enter the game in round I and the 
other one resulting from the decision to not do it, have to be compared in order to select the 
best strategy for the player. The first is 	) Y$ (3𝑉 − 4𝑃) while the second is 	) _$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃). It is 
clear that the latter is greater than the former and therefore the best strategy for the player is to 
enter the game in round I, if 𝑉 > 4𝑃. 
Different is the case in which 𝑉 < 4𝑃 because players change behaviour in next rounds. If a 
player is extracted in round I and he decides to enter the game, he pays with certainty the price 
P. In the second round, this same player has a probability of 	) Y$  to be extracted again and it has 
been shows that with 𝑉 < 4𝑃 a player will enter the game only if he paid the price in round I. 
So, this player obtains the product with valuation V by paying the second price. With the 
remaining probability of 	[ Y$ , the player is not extracted and the other two players will not enter 
the game because they would obtain a lower payoff if they pay the price in round II. In this 
case, in the third round, the player selected in round I, has another probability of 	) Y$  to be 
extracted and to obtain the product by paying the price. The sum of this expected utility is: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + 	) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + 	[ Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃). 
This result has to be compared with the utility that this player achieves if he does not pay the 
price in round I. Since, 𝑉 < 4𝑃, if a player does not enter the game in round I, he will not enter 
the game neither in round II nor in round III. So, the utility of the player who does not enter the 
game in round I with 𝑉 < 4𝑃 is equal to zero. The utility of the decision to pay the price in 
round I is greater than the utility of not doing it if ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃) > 0. The result of this 
inequality is 𝑉 > 	)a b$ 𝑃. 
The recap of the result of the analysis of the round I is the following: 
- if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, all players would pay the price in round I and II; 
- if )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃, all players would pay the price in round I, but in round II only the player 
selected in round I will pay; 
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- if 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃, all players would not pay the price in round I, and consequently also in the 
next rounds. 
The following table reports the numerical recap just explained. 
 
Table 4 - Case A players expected utility 
	𝑽 𝑷$  ratio Expected utility 𝑉 > 4𝑃 	) Y$ (3𝑉 − 4𝑃) )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 	) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃) 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃 0 
 
 
 
2.3 Seller’s profit 
 
The construction of previous games is an essential tool for the seller, who has to establish the 
optimal 	e f$  ratio in order to make profit. On the basis of the game set-up, he has to find the 
value of P that maximize his profits, considering his costs and players decision in the game.  
The three relationships between V and P reported in the last table are used in order to compute 
the seller’s profit and to find the one that maximize it. The first one to be analysed is the case 
in which 𝑉 > 4𝑃. As illustrated in the last recap, with these inequality, whoever player is 
extracted in the first or second round will enter the game. This means that the seller obtains 
with certainty two prices and has to bear the cost to dispatch the product considering round I 
and II. In the third one, only the two players not selected in round I will pay the price, but only 
if by doing it they obtain the product. So, the player selected in the first round obtains the 
product and then is not interested in entering the game in round III. If a second player is selected 
in round II, he will pay the price also in round III and this situation happens with probability 	) _$ . The same can be said for the third player. In these two cases the seller cashes in another 
price but on the other hand he has to dispatch a second product. Then, the total profit of the 
seller is: 𝜋 = 𝑃 + (𝑃 − 𝐶) + () _$ + ) _$ )(𝑃 − 𝐶) = ) _$ (20𝑃 − 11𝐶). 
This is the result considering the range 𝑉 > 4𝑃. Since the seller aim is to maximize his profit 
he has to select the value in this range that maximize the result just found. This point is the 
minimum one in which players behave as explained above and it is the maximum value of the 
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price for the seller. In this case, it is 𝑃∗ = ) a$ 𝑉. In fact, the more V is greater than 4P, the more 
the seller cashes in smaller prices, decreasing the profit. So, by substituting the optimal price 
into the profit, the result is 𝜋 = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 11𝐶). This profit is positive for all values of V such 
that 𝑉 > )) b$ 𝐶. 
The second range to be analysed is the one in which )a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃. With these values, it has 
been shown that a player pays the price with certainty in round I and in one of the other two 
rounds if he is selected. Players who have not been selected in round I will not enter the game 
in round II or III. Then the profit and the relative cost of the seller depends only on the 
possibility that the first player is extracted again. In round I, the seller cash in one price for sure. 
In the second round, he receives another price only if the same player is selected again in this 
round, with probability ) Y$ . With the remaining probability of [ Y$ , a different player than the 
one who paid the price in round I is extracted in round II. This player will not pay the price; 
however, the first player has the possibility to be selected in round III with probability ) Y$ , in 
which he will pay the price. Then, the resulting profit is: 𝜋 = 𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑃 − 𝐶) + [ Y$ () Y$ )(𝑃 − 𝐶) = ) _$ (14𝑃 − 5𝐶). 
This is the profit that the seller expects in the range )a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃. In order to maximize the 
profit, the seller has to choose the highest price in this range that is the point in which )a b$ 𝑃 =𝑉, then 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉. With this price, the profit is 𝜋 = b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶) and it is positive for all values 
of V greater than C. 
The last case is the one in which 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃. However, for these values, players have no 
incentive to pay the price because they would obtain a negative payoff. Then, the seller is not 
able to make profit.  
The table below shows the summary of the seller’s expected profit. The profit resulting from 
the behaviour of the players in the range )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 is always greater than the other one. 
Therefore, the seller should implement the highest value of P, i.e. 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉. 
 
Table 5 - Case A seller's profit 
Interval P* Expected profit 𝝅 > 𝟎 if 𝑉 > 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = ) a$ 𝑉 	) _$ (5V − 11𝐶) 𝑉 > )) b$ 	𝐶 
)a b$ 	< 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 	b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶) 𝑉 > C 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃 - 0 - 
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The next figure shows the “yes” scenario, the one in which the first player extracted pays the 
price. Red lines represent the best choices for the player if he is extracted. For the first player, 
it is considered the “unit demand” assumptions in fact he is not interest in entering the third 
round if he has already received the product. For this reason, the payoff in this state of the game 
are equal. His best decision is to pay the fee in the first and in the second round, as already 
explained. Conversely, for the other two players, the best decision is to not pay the fee, in any 
rounds. Otherwise, their expected utility would be negative. 
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Player 1 
chooses to 
enter the 
game
1
Yes
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
No a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
2
Yes )m )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
3
Yes )m )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
No
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
2
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
3
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
2
Yes
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉, _ )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
2
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
3
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
No - ) )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
2
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No - ) )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
3
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No - ) )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
3
Yes
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, _ )a⁄ 𝑉
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
2
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  - b )a⁄ 𝑉 _ )a⁄ 𝑉
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
3
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, a )a⁄ 𝑉
No _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No
1
Yes a )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
2
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉, - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
3
Yes _ )a⁄ 𝑉,  0, - b )a⁄ 𝑉
No - b )a⁄ 𝑉, 0, 0
Figure 4 - Representation of the "yes" scenario with P* = 5/14V 
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2.4 Cooperation among players 
 
Since the optimal price chosen by the seller implies that only the first extracted player will 
eventually pay the fee in other rounds, this player bears the risk to pay and to not receive the 
product if he is not selected again. Then, two of the three players could cooperate in order to 
achieve a better payoff for both of them: 
- the first player could have more probability to receive the product, 
- the second player (who would not enter the game otherwise) could achieve a positive 
payoff. 
It seems a positive solution for two of the three players involved. However, it has to be 
considered that benefits will be split as well as costs. This cooperation can be considered as a 
binding contract between these two players in which both players are obliged to pay the price 
if the payment is useful to receive one product. Then, a contract is required to bind the players 
to behave as reported in the agreement. This is the only procedure that leads the players to 
follow a predefined behaviour. The contract could specify that these two players will pay the 
necessary fees in order to obtain the product and then they will split cost (the fees paid) and the 
benefits (the use of the product). For ease it can be assumed that: 
- this type of product or service can be share or split somehow, 
- the unit demand concept is already valid so the two players who sign the contract need only 
one product, 
- the contract is proposed only after the first player is extracted so it is signed between round 
I and II. 
Otherwise, players will face a kind of a classical prisoner dilemma in a particular situation. In 
fact, if one of the two bound players is extracted in two rounds, then obtaining the product, his 
best option would be to not respect the contract and to not share the product. In this way, he 
would obtain a higher payoff, because he does not share the product. Then, without a binding 
contract and if the same player is extracted in two rounds, this player will prefer to ignore the 
agreement. 
The analysis of the cooperation effect will be conducted in two steps: 
- firstly, it is established whether the cooperation leads to a higher payoff than the previous 
game (with the tool of the backward induction), 
- second, it is determined the best pricing policy for the seller. 
In order to perform the analysis, the employed tool is the backward induction, as the previous 
case, in order to establish whether the cooperation is an optimal strategy. However, for this one, 
it has to be considered that two of the three players have a different probability of achieving a 
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positive payoff. This analysis considers only the range that maximized the profit for the seller 
in the previous case: )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 with the optimal price of 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉. 
 
Round III 
 
In the third round, any player who is on the waiting list will be interested in paying the fee in 
order to receive the product, as before. 
 
Round II 
 
In the second round, the two type of players has to be analysed separately. The player who is 
not in the contract will behave as explained above in this chapter. So, he will enter the game 
only if he is on the waiting list, otherwise he will not because of the range considered. The two 
players of the contract will behave as the third player if by paying the fee they obtain one 
product. But, if none of them was extracted in round I, they will enter the game only if 𝑉 >b [$ 𝑃. Since the interval )a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 is included in 𝑉 > b [$ 𝑃, with 𝑃 = b )a$ 𝑉, the two 
players of the contract will pay the price for sure, whether they are on the waiting list or not. 
 
Round I 
 
In the first round, the player outside the contract will enter the game if selected and the utility 
is already computed in the second paragraph of this chapter. Conversely, the utility of the two 
players of the contract has to be determined. If they enter the game in the first round, they have [ Y$  probability to be extracted again in the second round, in which they will pay the price. If 
with ) Y$  probability none of them is extracted, the third player will not pay in round II, but they 
have a further [ Y$  probability to be extracted in the third round. They have [ Y$  probability 
because both of them can rely on their own payment as well as on the payment of the other 
player who signed the contract. Then, these two players have a total utility of: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + [ Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + ) Y$ [[ Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] = ) _$ (8𝑉 − 17𝑃). 
However, this utility has to be split into two with a result equal to:  𝑈 = ) )m$ (8𝑉 − 17𝑃). 
This utility has to be compared with the one computed above in the second paragraph, without 
the binding contract. Then, the solution of the inequality 
 ) )m$ (8𝑉 − 17𝑃) > ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃) 
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is that the first utility is greater than the second one if 𝑉 < )) [$ 𝑃. Since the considered interval )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 is a sub interval of 𝑉 < )) [$ 𝑃, for all the values of the first range, the 
cooperation between two players is an optimal strategy. In fact, the players obtain for sure a 
better payoff with the contract than without it. 
 
Seller’s profit 
 
Because of the players cooperation, the seller’s profit changes. In fact, the new profit is 𝜋 =) [p$ (56𝑃 − 29𝐶). By substituting the optimal price 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉, the profit becomes 𝜋 =) [p$ (20𝑉 − 29𝐶). This result has to be compared with the best profit that the seller can achieve 
without the players cooperation. Then, by comparing it with b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶), there is no one which 
prevails on the other one. In fact, the profit in the case of cooperation is greater than the other 
one if 𝑉 > )a b$ 𝐶. Then, even if players cooperation, the seller could achieve a greater profit, 
for some values of V.  
However, the seller should verify whether there are better pricing strategies in case of players 
cooperation. In fact, because of symmetric information, the seller know that two players can 
cooperate after round I and then he can anticipate these players move by changing the price in 
advance (before round I).  In the round II analysis, it has been individuated a critical value, 𝑉 =b [$ 𝑃. This value is necessary to analyse the seller’s profit in the case he considers (or 
anticipates) the presence of the contract. If 𝑉 > b [$ 𝑃 the players (of the contract) will enter the 
game in round II even if no one pays the price in round I. If 𝑉 < b [$ 𝑃, the players (of the 
contract) will pay the price in round II or III only if they paid previously in round I and only if 𝑉 > )p m$ 𝑃. In both cases, the best decision for the two players is to enter the game gaining an 
expected utility of ) _$ (8𝑉 − 17𝑃), which has to be split into two. 
Then, two critical intervals of values emerge: 
- 𝑉 > b [$ 𝑃 
- )p m$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < b [$ 𝑃. 
In the first case, the seller sets 𝑃∗ = [ b$ 𝑉 and he gains a profit of 𝜋 = ) [p$ (mm b$ 𝑉 − 20𝐶). In the 
second case, the seller sets 𝑃∗ = m )p$ 𝑉 and he gains a profit of 𝜋 = ) [p$ (16𝑉 − 16𝐶). By 
comparing the two profits, the seller cannot choose definitely one price because the first is 
greater than the second if 𝑉 > b [$ 𝐶. Then, none of the prices prevails on the other one. These 
two expected profits have to be compared also with the one computed before, i.e. with the 
presence of the contract and with 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 	𝑉. At the end of the day, the seller’s profit depends 
on the relationship between V and C: 
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- if 𝐶 < )[ ab$ 𝑉, the higher profit is given by 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉, 
- if  )[ ab$ 𝑉 < 𝐶 < [ b$ 𝑉, the higher profit is given by 𝑃∗ = [ b$ 𝑉, 
- if 𝐶 > [ b$ 𝑉, the higher profit is given by 𝑃∗ = m )p$ 𝑉. 
The contract is an optimal strategy for the two players who signs it. However, the presence of 
the contract does not determine with certainty a lower or higher payoff for the seller because it 
remains subject to the values of V and C. 
 
A second type of cooperation can be analysed. In fact, when the first player is extracted, he 
could convince both the two other players to cooperate and not only one. This type of contract 
is equal to the previous one, but it involves all three players: it obliges the player selected in the 
second round to pay the fee. Then, players will split benefits and costs. It means that after round 
II, all players with certainty gain a part of the product, paying a portion of the price. The result 
is a certain utility equal to: 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 2𝑃). 
Since the price chosen by the seller is 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉, the utility is: 𝑈 = ) Y$ [𝑉 − 2(b )a$ 𝑉)] = [ [)$ 𝑉. 
At the end of the day, this utility is the same whether the players sign the contract before or 
after round I. However, conceptually the contract is signed after round I. This utility has to be 
compared with the payoff resulting from the contract between two players and the payoff 
without any contract. The following table summarizes the payoff of the three cases.  
 
 
Table 6 - Comparison of expected utilities with and without cooperation 
Case Expected utility function Payoff with 𝑷∗ = 𝟓 𝟏𝟒$ 𝑽 
No cooperation 𝑈 = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃) 0 
Cooperation between 2 players 𝑈 = ) )m$ (8𝑉 − 17𝑃) b [m$ 𝑉 
Cooperation among 3 players 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 2𝑃) [ [)$ 𝑉 
 
 
The result is that: 
- a cooperation among the three players is better than to not cooperate, 
- a cooperation among exclusively two players is better than the cooperation of all the three 
players. 
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It means that a cooperation among all players will not be implemented if two of the three players 
are already bound by a two-players contract. 
The possible extensions of this case are two: on one hand, the possibility for the player excluded 
by the contract (for ease he is called “the third player”), to pay a bigger part of the fee than the 
other two players; on the other hand, the sign of 3-players contract with the aim to receive two 
product (and not only one). In the former, the other two players could be incentivized to include 
also the third player in the contract because they would pay a lower price, gaining a higher 
payoff. This seems an optimal strategy for the third player. In fact, since it is assumed that the 
contract is sign between round I and II, with the optimal price without cooperation (𝑃∗ =b )a$ 𝑉), he would not enter the game because someone else paid in round I. However, he can 
propose this type of contract in order to convince the other two players to sign a 3-players 
contract. In this way, the third player can achieve a positive payoff and the other two players 
are incentivized to sign the 3-players contract because they gain a better payoff than the 2-
players contract one. So, a 3-players contract with a transfer from one player to the other two 
is an optimal strategy for each player. The seller’s profit, in this case, is given with certainty by 
the difference of the two fees he cashes in and the cost of one product. Then, he should ask the 
highest possible price. This last one coincides with the highest price that the third player is able 
to pay, considering the transfers to the other two players. In fact, it is sufficient that the third 
player is incentivized to enter the game by cooperating in order to create the precondition for 
(and also to make mandatory) the 3-players contract. Then the optimal price is the one which 
make zero (or slightly positive) the utility function of the third player, after the two transfers.  
The cooperation among players is feasible if it is achievable with a really low cost or better 
costly. This is a strong simplifying assumption because whether cooperation requires some 
costs for the players, their best strategy depends on the extent of these cost. Then, when players 
decide to cooperate they should account for these cost as well as the seller. If the latter 
anticipates the cooperation among players, he has to pay particular attention on the choice of 
the optimal price. In fact, he has to consider all the possible costs for the players. If he 
overestimates these cost, he could set a lower price in order to encourage player to enter the 
game cooperating and: 
- he “lose” a part of the payoff because he could have set a higher price, 
- players do not cooperate, modifying the expected profit.  
If he underestimates these cost, he could set a higher price and this action could discourage 
player to enter the game with cooperation or not, gaining no profit. 
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In the second extensions, the three players sign a contract (after round I) in order to receive two 
products, meaning that they will pay in both round II and III. With this strategy, the utility of 
all the three players is: 𝑈 = ) Y$ (2𝑉 − 3𝑃). 
Since it is assumed that the contract is signed after round I, the seller has already set the optimal 
price equal to 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉  which is the best price in the case of no cooperation. With this price 
the utility is:  𝑈 = ) Y$ [2𝑉 − 3(b )a$ 𝑉)] = )Y a[$ 𝑉. 
This value is greater than both the 2-players contract and the 3-players contract (the first one 
analysed). Then, after round I, the first player should propose this type of contract to the other 
two players. However, in this case the seller has to possibility to retaliate. In fact, he can set the 
price equal to the maximum amount which convince the 3 players to behave in this way. This 
price is the result of the following inequality: ) Y$ (2𝑉 − 3𝑃) > 0. 
The result is 𝑃∗ = [ Y$ 𝑉. With this price, the payoff of the three players is equal to zero. Then, 
for the first player extracted is better to choose a 2-players contract cooperating with one of the 
other two players. In this way, he has the possibility to achieve a positive payoff, which is better 
than gain for sure a zero payoff. Then, the only contract among all players that could work is 
the one which implies a transfer from one player to the other two ones.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ADDING ONE MORE ROUND 
 
 
3.1 Equilibrium analysis  
 
In this chapter, the effect which an introduction of a new round has on the game is examined. 
It is considered only the case in which V > P. In fact, it has been explained in chapter 2 that for 
all values of V such that V ≤ P, all players decide to not pay the price. This strategy is always 
the best one for all players, then the seller is unable to make any profit. The only case that 
provide a positive outcome for both players and seller is the one in which V	P. This game has 
the same characteristics of the case A, except for the increased number of rounds. Then: N=3, 
R=4, M=1, “unit demand” concept and the utility function equal to 𝑢(𝑦) = 𝑉 − 𝑦𝑃. 
In order to analyse this case, the backward induction technique is needed, as before. Then, it is 
necessary to analyse this case form the last round, that now is round IV.  
 
Round IV 
 
The analysis of this round is not different by the one made for the last round in the case A. 
When a player is extracted in the last round, the only relevant aspect is whether he is on the 
waiting list. To be on the list means that a player paid the price once and he have not receive 
the product yet. If he is on the waiting list and he is extracted, his decision is to pay the price in 
order to get the product. Otherwise, so if he is not on the waiting list, he has no incentive to pay 
the price because of two different reasons: 
- he has already been satisfied by receiving the product in a previous period  
- or he has never paid the price and then he will not do it in the last round for sure. 
 
Round III 
 
In the round III, a player has to analyse not only his current situations but also the possible 
future situations which could happen. A player extracted in this round faces different states of 
the game: 
- he already received the product, 
- he is on the waiting list, 
- he is not on the waiting list. 
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The first state of the game implies that this player paid the price in round I and someone else in 
round II. The first player received the product thanks to the second payment and he is no more 
interesting in entering the game. This is the concept of “unit demand” introduced in chapter 2. 
The meaning is that when a player obtains a product he has no interest anymore in participating 
the game, even if this could result in a second positive payoff for him (i.e. he gets another 
product). Therefore, his best strategy is to not pay the price. The utility gained by the first player 
is equal to 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 𝑃 that is positive since 𝑉 > 𝑃.  
In the second state of the game, the player extracted in round III is the same that paid the price 
in round II, but not in round I. In fact, if the same player paid the price in both round I and II, 
he has no interest in entering the game again in the next round. Then, if this kind of player is 
extracted in round III and he decides to pay the price, he has a payoff equal to 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃 
because he pays the price twice and he obtains the product. If his decision is to not do it, his 
utility depends on the probability to be extracted again or not in round IV. In fact, it has been 
explained that only a player that is on the waiting list would pay the price in the last round and 
this circumstance happens with probability ) Y$ . Then, the utility of the player is 𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃). 
The best strategy for the player is to pay the price if selected in round III, because he would 
obtain a greater utility. In fact: 𝑉 − 2𝑃 is greater than ) Y$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃) for all values of V such that 𝑉 > 𝑃, that is the case in analysis. 
The third state of the game implies that this player is extracted for the first time in round III. 
There are two histories that lead to this state: the same player paid in round I and II receiving 
the product or none of the players entered in the first two rounds. These two situations are equal 
for a new player extracted in round III. In fact, if a player is extracted for the first time in round 
III, the only aspect that matter is that by paying in the third and in the fourth round he has some 
probability to receive the product. Then, if the player extracted in round III is not on the waiting 
list, he expects to gain a utility of ) Y$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃) if he pays the price. Otherwise, if he does not 
pay the price in round III, he gains a zero utility. In fact, the player who is not in the waiting 
list in round IV does not enter the game. The utility of the decision to pay the price in round III 
is greater than the one to not do it if ) Y$ (𝑉 − 4𝑃) > 0 and the result is 𝑉 > 4𝑃. For all these 
values, the player who is extracted in round III and who is not on waiting list is incentivized to 
pay the price because he obtains a greater payoff. This analysis shows that: 
- if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, the best strategy for all players is to enter the game whether they are on the 
waiting list or not, 
- if 𝑉 < 4𝑃, only a player who is on the waiting list would pay, otherwise he would not. 
These two ranges of values are necessary to analyse the players behaviour in the second round. 
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Round II 
 
Considering first 𝑉 > 4𝑃, a player extracted in second round behaves differently if he is on the 
waiting list or not. If he is on the waiting list and he decides to pay the price he obtains with 
certainty a payoff equal to 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃. In fact, by paying the second time the price, he obtains 
the product. If he decides to not pay the price in this round the utility depends on next rounds 
extractions. From the explanation of round III, the final utility can be predicted. In fact, if he is 
extracted in the third round, since he is on the waiting list, he will pay with certainty. Moreover, 
also players who are not on the waiting list will pay the price in round III if they are extracted. 
This is a peculiar circumstance that reveals only in this case and that differentiate it from the 
case with 3 rounds. Then, the utility of the player is composed by three factors: 
- the price paid in previous round, P, 
- the fact that he is extracted in round III and pays the price, as explained in round III analysis, 
- the fact that he is not extracted in round III and someone else pays the price. 
The last point derives from the fact that in round III, whoever is the player extracted, he will 
pay the price because “to pay the price” is an optimal strategy for all players in this specific 
round. The utility is: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ (𝑉) = 𝑉 − a Y$ 𝑃. 
By comparing the utility that he obtains by paying the price in round II to the one obtained by 
not paying the price, the best strategy for a player extracted in round II, who is on the waiting 
list, is to not pay the price. In fact, 𝑉 − a Y$ 𝑃 > 𝑉 − 2𝑃. This result is quite interesting. The 
explanation is that a player extracted in round II knows that if another player is extracted in 
round III, he will pay the price. Then, player extracted in round II obtains one product by paying 
only one price. This is due because of: 
- the high difference between the valuation and the price that he should pay, 
- the fact that players are extracted in a round “far” from the last one. 
For this reason, it is more convenient to rely on the payment of another player in round III, than 
paying the second price to receive the product.  
The second range is such that 𝑉 < 4𝑃. In this case, if the selected player is on the waiting list 
and he decides to pay the price, he gains the same payoff than the one in the range 𝑉 > 4𝑃: 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃. If the player decides to not pay the price in this round he bears the risk to not 
receive the product. In fact, since 𝑉 < 4𝑃, it has been explained that in round III only a player 
who is on the waiting list will decide to pay the price. It means this player can obtain the good 
only if he personally pays the price twice, because none of other players will pay. Then, the 
utility is: 
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𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃). 
The first addend is the price paid in round I; the second one is the probability to be extracted in 
round III in which he pays the price; the last one is the probability to be extracted in round IV 
and not in round III, in which he pays the price. This utility has to be compared with the one 
resulting from his decision to pay the price in round II. In this case this last one is greater. Then 
if a player on the waiting list is extracted in round II, he will decide to pay the price, receiving 
the product.  
A different case is the one in which a player is extracted in round II but he is not on the waiting 
list, always considering 𝑉 < 4𝑃. If a player decides to pay the price in round II, he gains the 
same utility as the player who is on the waiting list but does not pay the price in round II. In 
fact, the utility to enter the game in round II is: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃). 
If the player, who is not on the waiting list, decide to not enter the game neither in round II, his 
utility will be zero. In fact, a player, who is not on the waiting list, will enter the game in round 
III only if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, but in this case the opposite is considered, i.e. 𝑉 < 4𝑃. In order that this 
type of player chooses to enter the game in round II, the respective utility should be greater than 
zero, ) _$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃) > 0. This inequality is satisfied for all values of V such that 𝑉 > )a b$ 	𝑃. 
The analysis of the round II shows multiple results. In fact: 
- if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, a player decides to pay the price if he is not on waiting list, otherwise he choose 
to not pay; 
- if )a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃, a player decides to pay the price in any case; 
- if 𝑉 < )a b$ 	𝑃, a player decides to enter the game if he is already on the waiting list, otherwise 
he does not. 
These three ranges of values will be used in order to analyse the behaviour of a player extracted 
in round I. 
  
Round I 
 
When a player is extracted in the first round he has to compute his utility considering the 
behaviour of other players in the next rounds. All these behaviours have been explained so far. 
Then, for each ranges of values, the first player extracted knows how players in the next round 
will reacts to the decision he takes in the first round. 
The first range considered is 𝑉 > 4𝑃. If the player chooses to pay the price in the first round 
has a certain cash out equal to P. In the second round, he faces two possibilities. The first occurs 
with probability [ Y$  and it is in the case in which a different player is extracted. This player will 
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pay the prices for sure and because of this, the player extracted in round I obtains the product 
with valuation V by paying only one P. With the remaining probability of ) Y$ , the same player 
is extracted again in round II. In this case, this player will not pay the price because he gains an 
expected higher utility. Then, with probability ) Y$ , it has to be considered the behaviour of 
players in round III. Whoever player extracted in round III will take the decision to pay the 
price. With a probability of ) Y$  is the same player extracted in round I, so he pays the price for 
the second time and he receives the product. With a probability of [ Y$ , another player is selected. 
This player pays the price and allows the first player to get the product. The following utility 
function are the result of all these situations: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)] + +[ Y$ (𝑉) = 𝑉 − )' _$ 𝑃. 
On the other hand, if a player does not pay the price in round I, he bears the risk to be selected 
in the following rounds or not. With ) Y$  probability he is selected in round II and since he is not 
on the waiting list, his best strategy is to pay the price. Then, with another probability ) Y$ , he is 
extracted in round III, in which he will pay the price the second time in order to receive the 
product. But, with a probability of [ Y$ , a different player is extracted, who will pay the price. In 
this way, the first player receives the product by paying only one price. In round II, he has a [ Y$  
probability to not be extracted. In this circumstance, he remains only the last two rounds to 
enter the game. If he is extracted in round III, his best strategy is to pay the price. Then, he will 
pay the price also in round IV if he is extracted, with probability ) Y$ . With the residual 
probability, he is not extracted and he receives nothing even if he paid one price. The utility 
function is: 𝑈 = ) Y$ [−𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ (𝑉)] + [ Y$ {) Y$ [−𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)]} = ) [p$ (11𝑉 − 20𝑃). 
Then, the two results that a player expects in round I whether he enters the game or not are: 𝑉 − )' _$ 	𝑃 if he pays the price in round I and ) [p$ (11𝑉 − 20𝑃) if he does not. The first utility 
is greater than the second one for all values of V such that 𝑉 > )' )y$ 𝑃. Since, in this case, the 
range 𝑉 > 4𝑃 is considered, the valuation V will be in any case higher than )' )y$ 𝑃. Then, the 
decision to pay the price for a player extracted in round I is always his optimal strategy. 
The second relevant range is )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃. For these values of V, players in next rounds act 
differently than the case in which 𝑉 > 4𝑃. Then, the expected utilities are different. If a player 
decides to pay the price in round I has an immediate outflow of P. Then, in the second round, 
whoever player is extracted, he will enter the game, if he is in the waiting list or not, as described 
above in the analysis of this round. With ) Y$  probability, this player is the same of the round I 
and he will pay the second time the price to obtain the product. With the residual probability 
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([ Y$ ), a different player is extracted and also this second player will pay the price, allowing the 
first player to receive the product. Therefore, the utility of a player selected in round I is:  𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ (𝑉) = 𝑉 − a Y$ 𝑃. 
If a player decides to not enter the game in the first round he has ) Y$  probability to be extracted 
in the next round and a probability of [ Y$  to not be selected. In the first case, he will pay the 
price in round II. Successively, he could be selected also in round III, in which he enters the 
game by paying the second time the price and receiving the product. If he is not selected in 
round III, with a probability of [ Y$ , he has the last possibility to pay the price in round IV, in 
which he will pay the second price to gain the product. In the second case, another player is 
selected in round II and with a ) Y$  probability the first player is selected in round III. But in this 
round, his best strategy is to not enter the game since he is not on the waiting list and 𝑉 < 4𝑃. 
In fact, the values of V are not high enough to permit the player to achieve a positive expected 
utility by paying the price in round III. Then, he gains a zero payoff. The utility of this case is: 𝑈 = ) Y$ {−𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)]} + [ Y$ {) Y$ (0) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (0)]} = ) [p$ (5𝑉 − 14𝑃). 
The utility to enter the game in round I is greater than the utility to not enter for all values of V 
such that 𝑉 > )a b$ 𝑃. So, the decision to pay the price in round I is the best strategy for a player 
selected in round I if )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃. 
The last range is such that 𝑉 < )a b$ 𝑃. If a player extracted in round I pays the price he has: 
- ) Y$  probability to be extracted in round II, in which he pays the price again and he receives 
the product, 
- [ Y$  probability that another player is extracted in round, who does not pay the price. 
In this last case, he has to consider the third round. In this one, he has a probability of ) Y$  to 
receive the product because he is selected and he pays the price, being on the waiting list. In 
the residual probability, another player is extracted and he does not enter the game. Then, in 
the round IV, the player extracted in the first round has the last possibility to pay the price and 
to gain the product, with probability ) Y$ . The expected utility of the first player is: 𝑈 = −𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ {) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (𝑉 − 𝑃)]} = ) [p$ (17𝑉 − 44𝑃). 
This result has to be compared with the utility that the player expects if he does not enter the 
game in the first round. However, since the range 𝑉 < )a b$ 𝑃 is considered, none of the player 
extracted from round II to IV will decide to enter the game because they are not on the 
waiting list. Therefore, the utility to not pay the price in round II is zero. A player who is 
extracted in round I decide to enter the game if: ) [p$ (17𝑉 − 44𝑃) > 0. The solution is the 
range of values such that 𝑉 > aa )p$ 𝑃. The point in which 𝑉 = aa )p$ 𝑃 is the minimum level 
that a player requires in order to enter the game in the first round. 
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This analysis shows that four ranges of values are relevant: 
- if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, all players will pay the price in any round if they are on the waiting list, except 
for the first selected player who does not pay if extracted in round II; 
- if )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃, all players will pay the price in any rounds in any case, except for a 
player extracted in round III who is not on the waiting list; 
-  aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < )a b$ 𝑃, all players will pay the price in any rounds if they are on the 
waiting, 
- if 𝑉 < aa )p$ 𝑃, none of the players is interested in entering the game. 
For each range of values of the first point, the player expects different utilities because players 
behaviour modifies in the subsequent rounds. For the last range of values, all players will 
achieve a utility equal to zero. In fact, none of them is incentivized to pay the price because 
costs are higher than benefits. The following table shows the best outcome that a player 
selected in the first round can achieve, on the basis of the 	z {$  ratio. 
 
Table 7 - Case B players expected utility 
	𝑽 𝑷$  ratio Expected utility 𝑉 > 4𝑃 𝑉 − 	)' _$ 𝑃 )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑉 − a Y$ 𝑃 aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃 	) [p$ (17𝑉 − 44𝑃) 𝑉 < 	aa )p$ 𝑃 0 
 
 
 
3.2 Seller’s profit 
 
For each of the four ranges of values illustrated above, the seller achieves different level of 
profits. As consequence, he should establish the value of P on the basis of the maximum 
expected profit he can reap. 
In the case of the first range, 𝑉 > 4𝑃, the seller cashes in for sure a price in the first round. In 
the second round, the revenues depend on who is extracted. The breakdown can be divided on 
the basis of two potential situations: in round II is extracted the same player of round I or not. 
In the first case, he will not pay the price and the seller has no revenues. Then, in round III, 
whoever player is selected, he will pay the price and the seller cashes in a price, but he has to 
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bear the cost of the dispatch of one product. At the end in round IV, the seller has the possibility 
to earn another price and to dispatch another product if the two players who have not been 
extracted in round I are extracted both in round III and IV. In the second case, in round II a 
different player than the first one is extracted, who pay the price and then the seller has to 
dispatch one product. In the following rounds, the first player will not participate anymore 
because he already received the product. Then, in third round only the two players who have 
not been extracted in round I will participate for sure, independently they are on the waiting list 
or not. Conversely, in the last round, the second or the third player will pay the price only if 
this price let them obtains the product. Therefore, the seller’s payoff is: 𝜋 = ) Y$ {) Y$ (𝑃 − 𝐶) + [ Y$ [) Y$ (2𝑃 − 2𝐶)} + [ Y$ <|) Y$ ∙ ) Y$ + ) Y$ ∙ 1~(2𝑃 − 2𝐶) + ) Y$ |) Y$ ~(3𝑃 − 3𝐶)@ =) [p$ (56𝑃 − 29𝐶). 
Considering that this level of profit is achievable for all values of V such that 𝑉 > 4𝑃, the seller 
has to choose the maximum value of P. This value lies in the point in which 𝑃∗ = ) a$ 𝑉. By 
substituting the profit becomes 𝜋 = ) [p$ (14𝑉 − 29𝐶). This profit is positive if 𝑉 > [_ )a$ 𝐶. 
In the second case, V is such that )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃. As the previous case, in the first round, any 
extracted player will pay the price and the same situation is replicated in round II. However, 
seller’s payoff depends on who is extracted in the second round. In fact, if the same player is 
extracted in both first and second round, in the next rounds none of the players will pay the 
price. Then, the seller gains two prices and he has to dispatch one product. If the players 
extracted in round I and II are different, the player extracted in the second round will pay the 
price also the first time is extracted in the last two rounds. In this event, the seller gains a total 
of three prices and he has to dispatch two products. The total expected profit is: 𝜋 = 𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑃 − 𝐶) + [ Y$ [) Y$ () Y$ ) + ) Y$ (1) + ) Y$ () Y$ )](2𝑃 − 2𝐶) = ) [p$ (52𝑃 − 25𝐶). 
The best price that the seller can choose in order to maximize his profits is the lower bound of 
the range considered: then it is 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉. By substituting the resulting profit is: 𝜋 =) [p$ ()Y' p$ 𝑉 − 25𝐶) which is positive if 𝑉 > Yb [y$ 𝐶. 
The third range to analyse is aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃. In this case, only the first player extracted 
will pay the price in round I and in the first following round in which he is extracted. This round 
is: 
- round II with 	) Y$  probability 
- round III with 	[ _$  with probability 
- round IV with 	a [p$  probability. 
The seller’s expected profit is: 𝜋 = 𝑃 + ) Y$ (𝑃 − 𝐶) + [ Y$ () Y$ ∙ 1 + [ Y$ ∙ ) Y$ )(2𝑃 − 2𝐶) = ) [p$ (46𝑃 − 19𝐶). 
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Considering the range aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃, the seller can maximize the profit if 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉. 
Then, the profit become 𝜋 = ) [p$ (Y_) [[$ 𝑉 − 19𝐶) that is positive for all values of V such that 𝑉 > a)m Y_)$ 𝐶. 
In the last range of values 𝑉 < 	aa )p$ 𝑃, none of the players will pay the price in any rounds and 
the seller is unable to make profits.  
The table below illustrates the expected profit for each range of values, given the optimal price. 
The expected profit deriving from the first range is lower than the other two for any value of V. 
In the case of the second and the third range there is no an absolute optimal price. In fact, if 𝐶 > a) Y'm$ 𝑉, the seller should implement a price equal to 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 (third range), otherwise 
he should implement a price equal to 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉. 
 
Table 8 - Case B seller's profit 
Interval P* Expected profit 𝝅 > 𝟎 if 𝑽 > 𝟒𝑷 𝑃∗ = ) a$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (14𝑉 − 29𝐶) 𝑉 > [_ )a$ 𝐶 
𝟏𝟒 𝟓$ 𝑷 < 𝑽 < 𝟒𝑷 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 ) )m_$ (130𝑉 − 175𝐶) 𝑉 > Yb [y$ 𝐶 
𝟒𝟒 𝟏𝟕$ 𝑷 < 𝑽 < 	𝟏𝟒 𝟓$ 𝑷 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 ) b_a$ (391𝑉 − 418𝐶) 𝑉 > a)m Y_)$ 𝐶 𝑽 < 	𝟒𝟒 𝟏𝟕$ 𝑷 - 0 - 
 
 
 
3.3 Comparison with case A 
 
The comparison between case A and B is useful for two reasons: 
- to establish the effect of a change of the parameter R in the players expected utility, 
- to permit the seller to determine which case has the best characteristics in order to maximize 
his profit. 
With respect to the first point, case A and B shows some similarities and some differences. The 
most important similarity is the behaviours of players in the last two rounds. In fact, players 
will react equally in these rounds for the same value of V, whether the game has 3 or 4 rounds. 
On the other hand, differences appear by comparing the first round in case A with the first two 
ones in case B. The first is straightforward in fact an increase in the parameter R lead to an 
increase of the expected utility for the first player extracted. This is a quite obvious conclusion 
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because by continuously increasing the parameter R, players have more and more possibility to 
be extracted, to pay and receive the product. Moreover, case B analysis shows an interesting 
circumstance. Indeed, the most important difference is the behaviour of players in the second 
round. It is not possible to make a comparison considering each round of case A and comparing 
it with the respective one of case B because of the different value of R. However, it is possible 
to make two groups of rounds. The first group comprehends the last two rounds of both game. 
In these rounds the player behaviours are identical, as said above. The second group considers 
the round I of case A and the rounds I and II of case B. In this group there is an important 
difference in a specific player behaviour. A player that pays the price in round I will choose to 
not enter the game in round II because, for a sufficient high value of V (in the case 𝑉 > 4𝑃), 
his best choice is to rely on another player payment in the next round than to pay himself the 
second amount needed to ship the good. Then, if the first player is extracted again in round II, 
his best strategy is to wait and not enter in this round because he expects that if a different 
player is extracted in round III, this last one will pay the price allowing the first player to receive 
the good. If this event did not happen, the first player will pay the price only in round III. This 
situation reveals exclusively in round II on a total of four rounds. But, the more the parameter 
R increases, the more rounds would show an equal circumstance. This is a crucial statement 
that changes an important aspect of the game. In the case A, the best response of the first player 
is always to pay the price in order to receive the good. Conversely, this strategy is not always 
the best one in case B. Generally, if the first player extracted is selected again in a round 
sufficient far from the last one, this player prefers to wait that a different one pays the price in 
the next round. Then, with a high value of R and with a sufficient high level of V, this scenario 
will be repeated in a higher number of rounds. This situation makes more realistic the game 
because this is what the reality shows. In fact, in the real world, empirics shows that a customer 
has no incentive to enter the game in the immediate rounds next the one which he paid in. 
Indeed, he prefers to wait and to rely on another player payment in order to receive the good, 
gaining the maximum potential utility. 
The second point is related to the seller. In fact, the comparison between case A and B is a tool 
for the seller in order to determine the level of P that maximize his profit. The optimal P value 
is the one that: 
- incentivizes the player to pay the price, 
- permits the seller to make profit. 
The table below shows a recap of all the relevant optimal prices and expected profits computed 
for case A and case B. In fact, only these three listed expected profits have to be compared in 
order to determine the best one for the seller. However, in previous paragraph, it has been shown 
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that case B provide two optimal prices on the basis of the ratio between V and C. By comparing 
the profit of case A with the ones of case B the results are: 
- case A is better than the first profit of case B if 𝐶 >	 y) mm$ 𝑉, 
- case A is better than the second profit of case B if 𝐶 <	 b )a$ 𝑉. 
 
Table 9 - Comparison of case A and B expected profit  
 Interval P* Expected profit 𝝅 > 𝟎 if 
Case 
A 
)a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 	b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶) 𝑉 > 𝐶 
Case 
B 
)a b$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 ) [p$ ()Y' p$ 𝑉 − 25𝐶) 𝑉 > Yb [y$ 	𝐶 aa )p$ 	𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 	𝑃 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (Y_) [[$ 𝑉 − 19𝐶) 𝑉 > a)m Y_)$ 	𝐶 
 
 
 
These two results have to be added to the comparison between the two ranges of case B. 
Therefore, the complete analysis is: 
- if 𝐶 < a) Y'm$ 𝑉, the best price is 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 in case B, 
- if a) Y'm$ 𝑉 < 𝐶 < y) mm$ 𝑉, the best price is 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 in case B, 
- if 𝐶 > y) mm$ 𝑉, the best price is 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 in case A. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISPATCH COEFFICIENT 
 
 
4.1 Equilibrium analysis 
 
The game dynamics has to be analysed also considering the weight that a change of the dispatch 
coefficient has on the game equilibrium. In this chapter, two cases are considered. The first one 
(case C) has the same number of rounds and players of the case B but with M=2, the second 
one (case D) has a further round more. Then, these two cases will be compared firstly between 
each other and secondly with the best cases found so far.  
In the analysis of the extensions of the simple case A, variable N will be not considered. In fact, 
it is straightforward that the more the number of players increase, the more these last one will 
require a low value of P in order to enter the game. The cause is that the more players has the 
possibility to participate the game, the more will decrease the probability to be selected again 
and receive the product, if there is a low number of rounds. So, an increase of the parameter N 
should be counterbalance by an increase of the parameter R in order to keep quite constant the 
expected utility to receive one product. However, ceteris paribus, an increase of players will 
discourage them to enter the game. For this reason, it is more important to concentrate the 
extensions analysis on parameter R and M.  
The two cases which are analysed in the next paragraph consider only a value of V such that 𝑉 > 𝑃. In fact, it has been shown in chapter 2 that for all values P greater or equal than V, 
players has no incentive to participate the game because they would obtain a negative expected 
payoff. 
A value of the dispatch coefficient equal to 2 means that a player is able to receive the product 
only if in the four rounds there two further payments after his own one and all players that paid 
before him have already receive the product. This aspect is crucial because in the analysis of 
this case it does not matter only the fact that a player is or is not on the waiting list, but it matters 
also that he is the first on the waiting list who has not yet been satisfied with the product 
dispatch. The backward induction technique is the tool to analyse the game equilibrium, as for 
previous cases.  
 
 
 
 
 54   
Round IV 
 
The first round to be analysed is the fourth one. In this one, a player has incentive to enter the 
game and pay the price only if by doing it, he can receive the product. It is not sufficient 
anymore that the last selected player is on the waiting list. The reason is that by considering 
only that fact that he is on the waiting list, he could pay the price that will be used in order to 
dispatch a product for another player, then obtaining a negative utility.  
 
Round III 
 
In the round III, two states of the game could show up: the first is the one in which a player can 
receive the product by paying the price, the second is the opposite so the payment of this round 
is not sufficient to obtain the product. The former implies two similar circumstances for the 
selected player: 
- he paid in round I and II, 
- he paid in round I and someone else in round II.  
In both these circumstances, the player will pay the price with certainty. In fact, he gains a 
positive payoff (𝑈 = 𝑉 − 3𝑃 and 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 2𝑃 respectively) that is greater with respect to the 
one that he would obtain by not paying the price in this round. The second circumstance 
provides a better payoff than the first one but in order to analysis the feasibility of this 
circumstance round I and II have to be considered. However, the key point is that in this first 
state of the game a player will pay the price absolutely. In the second state of the game, a player 
is not able to obtain the product by paying in this round. This situation implies three different 
circumstances for the selected player: 
- he paid the price in round II but someone else in round I, 
- he paid in round I and no one in round II (or vice versa), 
- he never paid. 
In the first one, he has no incentive to pay the price. If he pays the price has a utility of –2P 
because he pays the price twice, but he has no possibility to receive the product because he 
would need another round, after the fourth one. Then, the best strategy is to not pay the price 
with a utility of –P resulting from the fact that he paid in round II. In the second circumstance, 
he paid once in round I or II (and no one in the remaining) so by paying the price in round III, 
he has ) Y$  probability to be extracted and to obtain the price by paying again the price. If he 
does not pay the price in this round, he will do the same in the next one. The utility of paying 
the price is 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 7𝑃) and the one of not paying is –P. Then, a player in this situation 
 55   
will be pay the price only if 𝑉 > 4𝑃. However, by substituting the minimum value 𝑉 = 4𝑃	in 
the first utility, the player will achieve a negative payoff. It means that, differently from what 
it has been shown in case A or B, the first utility has not to be only greater than the second one, 
but it has to be also greater than zero, otherwise even a risk neutral player will not participate. 
Then, the utility of paying the price is greater than zero if 𝑉 > 7𝑃. The meaning is that: 
- if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, the player gains a better utility by paying, but it could be negative, 
- if 𝑉 > 7𝑃, the player gains a better and non-negative utility by paying. 
These last ranges of values are considered in order to examine the next round. 
In the third circumstance, the selected has never paid the price. In this case, it does not matter 
whether a different player paid the price in round I, II, or whether none of the players paid the 
price, because this player has no incentive to pay the price. In fact, in order to receive the 
product, he would need at least a further round after the fourth round. So, the best strategy is to 
not pay the price. The analysis of all these three circumstance shows that in round II has to be 
considered two ranges of values: 𝑉 > 7𝑃 and 𝑉 < 7𝑃. 
 
Round II 
 
In the second round, if 𝑉 > 7𝑃, there are three possible states of the game:  
- the extracted player paid the price in round I, 
- he did not, 
- or someone else did it.  
If in the first one he pays the price, he has b _$  probability to pay the price in round III or IV, 
with a utility of 𝑈 = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 23𝑃). If he does not pay the price in this round, the only 
possibility to receive the product is to be selected in both game. The resulting utility is 𝑈 =) _$ (𝑉 − 11𝑃). The first utility is always better than the second and also positive, then the player 
should pay.  
In the second state of the game none of player paid in round I. The utility to pay the price is 
equal to the last found, in which the player does not pay the price, but he did pay in round I. If 
the player does not pay in second round, his utility will be zero because he has no possibility to 
receive the product then he will never pay. The “yes” decision is better than the “no” one if ) _$ (𝑉 − 11𝑃) > 0, that is 𝑉 < 11𝑃. For all these values of V, the player will pay and will obtain 
a positive expected payoff.  
In the third state of the game, a player is selected in round II but a different one paid in round 
I. For this reason, the best strategy of the one selected in this round II is to not pay the price, 
because there are no enough rounds to satisfy also a second player. 
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The second round has to be analysed also considering all values such that 𝑉 < 7𝑃. The three 
states of the game remain the same.  
In the first one, a player is extracted in this round and he also paid in round I. The utility to 
enter the game remains the same, 𝑈 = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 23𝑃). While, the utility to not do it changes. 
In fact, considering that 𝑉 < 7𝑃, if this player does not pay the price in this round, his best 
strategy is to not pay the price in next rounds because he would obtain a negative expected 
utility. Therefore, the utility to pay the price is greater to not do it if 𝑉 > )a b$ 𝑃. However, for 
these values, a player risk to obtain a negative utility. In fact, the utility to pay the price has to 
be greater than both –P and zero in order to be a best strategy. Only with a value of V such that 𝑉 > [Y b$ 𝑃, the utility to pay the price is greater than zero.  
In the second state of the game, the one in which no one paid the price in round I, the best 
strategy for a selected player is to not pay the price. In fact, since 𝑉 < 7𝑃, he would obtain a 
negative expected utility by entering the game in round II. The solution of the third state of the 
game is the same whether 𝑉 < 7𝑃 or 𝑉 > 7𝑃, i.e. the selected player does not enter the game. 
Round II analysis shows four relevant ranges of values: 𝑉 > 11𝑃, 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃, [Y b$ 𝑃 <𝑉 < 7𝑃 and 𝑉 < [Y b$ 𝑃. In order to examine the players’ behaviour in the first round exactly 
these ranges will be crucial alongside the fact that only the first player extracted will enter the 
game, because of rounds constraint and as shown in round II. 
 
Round I 
 
In the first round, the utility to enter the game is greater than the one to not do it for all values 
of V such that 𝑉 > 11𝑃 and 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃. In fact, for all these values, when the same player 
is selected again in next rounds, he will always pay the price in order to receive the product. In 
the case of the third range, [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, the player will not always pay the price. In fact, if 
he is extracted in round I and II, he will pay the price again in the last two rounds, if extracted; 
but if he is not selected in the round II, he will not pay in next rounds. The resulting utility is 𝑈 = ) [p$ (5𝑉 − 37𝑃). This result has to be compared with the utility of not paying the price in 
round I, that is zero. In fact, if 𝑉 < 7𝑃 and if the player does not pay the price in the first round, 
he will not pay in the second one neither. Then, the utility to enter the game is greater than zero 
if 𝑉 > Yp b$ 𝑃. It means that this is the minimum value that a player needs in order to enter the 
game in round I. But this value is outside the range considered, which is [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃. Then, 
for all the values of this interval, the first player extracted will not pay the price because he 
could gain a positive payoff only with a value greater than the upper bound, which is impossible. 
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Concluding, this game equilibrium shows that: 
- if 𝑉 > 7𝑃, in round I the player extracted will pay the price in this round and in all the next 
ones until a total of three payments, 
- if [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, none of the player will pay the fee, 
- if 𝑉 < [Y b$ 𝑃, none of the player will pay the price in any rounds. 
 
 
4.2 Seller’s profit 
 
Given the three ranges of values just described, the seller’s profit can be computed and analysed 
with respect to case A. Because of the characteristics of the case (R=4 and M=2), the seller has 
to consider the first player extracted, who is the only interested one in paying the price in other 
rounds next the first one.  
If 𝑉 > 7𝑃, the first player extracted pays the price each time he is extracted until round III. In 
the last round, he will enter the game only if it means that he will receive the product. The 
resulting expected profit for the seller is: 𝜋 = ) [p$ (53𝑃 − 11𝐶). The seller should choose the 
price that maximize his profit on the basis of the range of values considered. In this case it is 𝑃∗ = ) p$ 𝑉 and the resulting profit is 𝜋 = ) [p$ (bY p$ 𝑉 − 11𝐶). This result is positive if C <bY pp$ 𝑉.  
The second range of values is [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃. For these values, the first player extracted will 
not pay the fee in the first round and consequently none of the players will pay in any rounds. 
Then, the strategy to set a price in these range of values is dominated by the previous one, which 
sets 𝑃∗ = ) p$ 𝑉. In fact, with this price the seller should be able to make profits. 
In the last range, 𝑉 < [Y b$ 𝑃, the reasoning is the same: none of the player is interested in 
entering the game because of the certain negative expected utility. Then, the seller is unable to 
dispatch products and gains profits. 
Therefore, in this case there is a unique range to consider and a unique profit function equation. 
The range is 𝑉 > 7𝑃 and the seller expected profits are: 𝜋 = ) [p$ (53𝑃 − 11𝐶). 
 By substituting the optimal price for the seller, which is the maximum one he can ask, 𝑃∗ =) p$ 𝑉, the result is:	𝜋 = ) [p$ (bY p$ 𝑉 − 11𝐶). This profit is positive for all values of C such that 𝑉 > bY pp$ 𝐶. So, the best strategy for the seller is to choose the higher feasible price because it 
provides also the highest profit. 
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The table below summarizes the characteristics of the optimal game that the seller should 
implement in order to maximize the profit in each case. In case B, the profit maximization is 
not unique, but it is provided by two different prices on the basis of the value of the parameter 
C. 
 
Table 10 - Comparison of case A, B and C expected profit 
 Interval P* Expected profit 𝝅 > 𝟎 if 
Case 
A 
)a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 	b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶) 𝑉 > 𝐶 
Case 
B 
)a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 ) [p$ ()Y' p$ 𝑉 − 25𝐶) 𝑉 > Yb [y$ 𝐶 aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (Y_) [[$ 𝑉 − 19𝐶) 𝑉 > a)m Y_)$ 𝐶 
Case 
C 𝑉 > 7𝑃 𝑃∗ = ) p$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (bY p$ 𝑉 − 11𝐶) 𝑉 > pp bY$ 𝐶 
 
 
 
4.3 Comparison with case A and B 
 
In the comparison between case A and B, it has been shown that the seller has multiple optimal 
prices in order to maximize the profits: 
- if  𝐶 < a) Y'm$ 𝑉	[≈ 0.13], the best profit is provided by 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 of case B, 
- if a) Y'm$ 𝑉 < 𝐶 < y) mm$ 𝑉	[y) mm$ ≈ 0.69], the best price is 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 of case B, 
- if 𝐶 > y) mm$ 𝑉, the best option is case A. 
Case A is the best option until cost equalize the valuation, with a profit of zero. If the costs are 
greater than the valuation, all the cases provided negative expected profits. 
In order to determine whether case C provide a better or worse profit than these cases, it has to 
be compared with each of them. The results are the following: 
- case C is better than A if 𝐶 > )Y p$ 𝑉	[≈ 1.86], 
- case C is better than the first one of case B if 𝐶 > )) )a$ 𝑉	[≈ 0.79], 
- case C is better than the second one of case B If 𝐶 > )bp) )[Y[$ 𝑉	[≈ 1.28]. 
However, if 𝐶 > )) )a$ 𝑉, the expected profits of case C is negative. While if 𝐶 < )) )a$ 𝑉, the 
best cases remain case A and B as illustrated above.  
Then, the case C is dominated by all the other cases and the best one remains the same illustrated 
in the comparison between case A and B. By setting a higher value of the dispatch coefficient, 
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the seller should have relied in a situation in which he has more probability to gain prices and 
dispatch few products. However, empirics displays the opposite result. In fact, the seller gains 
a lower expected profit than case A and B due to the value of dispatch coefficient which 
discourage players to enter the game in a higher number of circumstances, causing a lower 
expected profit. At the end of the day, the option of increasing the parameter M lead to a 
decrease or to nullify the seller’s profit. Indeed, this strategy should be considered alongside an 
increase of the number of rounds in order to counter-balanced the negative effect of a higher 
value of M. The reason is that by increasing the number of rounds, a higher number of players 
should be incentivized to enter the game. The result should be higher profits for the seller, but 
it depends on the number of products he has to dispatch. The aim of the next paragraphs is to 
analyse this strategy in order to understand whether it can lead to a positive and better payoff.  
 
 
4.4 The effect of one further round if the dispatch coefficient is equal to 2 
 
This is the last case which complete the analysis of this type of game. It is characterized by 3 
players that can or not participate the game in 5 rounds. In order to have one product dispatch, 
the seller requires that two prices have to be paid, except for the payment of the first player on 
the waiting list. The price is lower than the valuation V, because only in this case players would 
consider entering the game. 
 
Round V 
 
The starting point is always the last round, that in this case is the fifth one. In this round, there 
is one type of player interested in entering the game. He is the one that can receive the product 
by paying the price, while all other players will not participate.  
 
Round IV 
 
In round IV, players behaviour has to be split on the basis of one basic circumstances: whether 
the selected player is the first subject on the waiting list or he is the second one. The former 
implies that the selected player: 
- paid in round I and II, but no one in round III, 
- paid in round I and someone else in round II or II (and no one in the residual), 
- paid only in round III and no one in the previous two rounds. 
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The first two states can be considered similar. In both of them, the selected player has the 
possibility to receiving the product by paying the price. Indeed, this is the best strategy for a 
player in this state of the game. Obviously, the second circumstance implies a higher expected 
utility because the player pays twice and not three times as in the second circumstance. But the 
choice to pay the price is in any case the best one.  
In the third state, the players selected in round IV paid the price in only one round in the past 
three rounds, and no one else paid in the remaining. In this case the only possibility to receive 
the product is the one in which he pays the price in this round and he is extracted again in round 
V. In this case the expected utility is 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 7𝑃). If the player decides to not enter the 
game in this round, he will not enter in round V neither with a final negative utility equal to the 
price paid in round III. By comparing 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 − 7𝑃) with 𝑈 = −𝑃, the result is that the first 
is greater than the second for all values of V such that 𝑉 > 4𝑃. However, by substituting 𝑉 =4𝑃 in the first utility, the player would obtain a negative utility. It means that it is true that the 
decision to pay in round IV gives a greater expected utility, but for some values of V the player 
would obtain anyway a negative utility. The values of V which makes positive this expected 
utility are all the values such that 𝑉 > 7𝑃.  
The second circumstance is the one in which the selected player is the second on the waiting 
list. It implies that this player: 
- paid in round II but someone else in round I and III, 
- paid in round II, someone else in round I and no one in round III, 
- paid in round II and III but someone else in round I. 
The first state is equal to last analysed one. In fact, if someone else paid in round I and III and 
the selected player paid in round II means that with the payment in round III, the first player 
received the product, quitting the list. Then, the player who paid in round II become the new 
first one on the list. In this case, his expected utility is equal to the one of a player who paid 
only in round III and no one in the others rounds. So, the result is that this type of player will 
obtain a greater expected utility by paying the price if 𝑉 > 4𝑃, but he gains a positive payoff 
only if 𝑉 > 7𝑃.  
In the second state, if a player is the second one on the list, he has no possibility to receive the 
product because of a lack of rounds. Then, he will choose to not pay the price, with a resulting 
utility of –P, which is better than the utility to pay also in round IV, –2P.  
In the third state, the player is the second one on the list and he paid already twice the price. As 
the first point, thanks to the payment in the third round he is the new first one on the list. 
However, differently from the first point, he will require a higher value of V in order to enter 
the game, because he paid already twice. The utility to pay the price in round IV is 𝑈 = ) Y$ (𝑉 −
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10𝑃), while the one to not do it is 𝑈 = −2𝑃. The former is greater if 𝑉 > 4𝑃 but it is positive 
only if 𝑉 > 10𝑃. So: 
- if 𝑉 < 4𝑃, he does not pay the price, 
- if 4𝑃 < 𝑉 < 10𝑃, he does pay the price obtaining a negative expected utility (but better 
than –2P), 
- if 𝑉 > 10𝑃, he does pay the price and he gains a positive expected utility. 
If the selected player in round IV is not on the waiting list, his best strategy is to not pay the 
price in fact he cannot receive the product because of a lack of rounds. 
Therefore, round IV analysis shows three significant range of values: 𝑉 > 10𝑃, 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 10𝑃 
and 𝑉 < 7𝑃. The analysis of the third round are conducted for each of these three ranges. 
 
Round III 
 
In this round, two cases have to be considered: 
- if the selected player is on the waiting list and consequently if he is the first or the second,  
- if he is not on the list.  
If he is the first on the list, it means that he: 
- paid in round I and II, 
- he paid in round I and someone else in round II, 
- he paid in round I and no one else in round II.  
The first two points are similar. In fact, the player can receive the product by paying the price 
in this round. However, in the second case he gains a higher payoff because he pays the price 
twice and not three times as in the first case. In the third point, the behaviour in the following 
rounds has to be consider. In the fourth round, a player who paid the price once is incentivized 
to pay the price when 𝑉 > 7𝑃. Since in this analysis all values of V greater than 10P are 
considered, the player will pay the price in the third round. 
If the selected player is the second one on the list means that he paid in round II but someone 
else pain round I. This player only possibility to receive the product is that in all round a 
payment is performed. Round IV analysis showed that if he is extracted in round III he will pay 
the price, given that 𝑉 > 10𝑃. The same will occur if the first player is extracted again in round 
III, but successively, in round IV and V, only the second player will pay the price to win the 
product. All these behaviour result in an expected utility equal to 𝑈 = ) _$ (𝑉 −20𝑃). This last 
one is greater than the utility to not pay the price in round III if 𝑉 > 11𝑃, but these value is not 
sufficient to guarantee a positive expected utility. The minimum value of V that make non-
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negative this utility function is 𝑉 = 20𝑃. For all the values greater than this one, a player who 
is the second on the list will pay the price in round III. 
The last case is the one in which the player who is extracted is not on the list. This time, the 
only aspect that matters for this player is that if a future payment in round IV will help him 
directly to receive the product. If this is not so, the player will not pay in round III. Conversely, 
if he is the case, the player will pay because it means that after the payment in round III, he is 
the first one on the waiting list. His possibility to receive the product is the one in which he is 
selected again in round IV and V. Then, the resulting utility is 𝑈 = ) _$ (𝑉 − 11𝑃). This player 
will enter the game only if this function is greater than zero, so for all values of V such that 𝑉 >11𝑃.  
The range in which 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 10𝑃 shows an identical behaviour for the player who is in the 
first position of the list. In fact, for all values of V greater than 7P, a player will pay the price 
in any case in the third and fourth round. Conversely, some differences reveal for a player who 
is the second one on the list and for a player who is not in it. In round IV it has been shown that 
a player who ranks second on the list and paid the price in round II and III, require a minimum 
value of V equal to 10P in order to pay also in round IV. Given that, since in this range 𝑉 <10𝑃, if this type of player pays the price in round III, his best strategy in round IV is to not pay 
the price. Then, his resulting utility is 𝑈 = −2P if he pays in round III and 𝑈 = −P if he does 
not. For this reason, the choice to not enter the game is his best response. The last case is the 
one in which the extracted player is not on the waiting list. His behaviour remains the same 
illustrated for previous range of values in which he requires a minimum value of 𝑉 = 11𝑃. This 
value does not fit with the considered range because it is outside it. For this cause, a player who 
is not on the waiting list will decide to not enter the game, with a utility of zero. 
In the case of the last range of values 𝑉 < 7𝑃, it can be forthwith reported that a player who is 
second on the list or not on it, the decision is to not pay the price in round II, as for previous 
range of values. The only difference lies in the behaviour of a player who is first on the list, 
precisely in one specific state of the game. In fact, if this player can receive the product by 
paying the price in round III, he will do it with certainty. This decision is not immediate in one 
only state of the game: the one in which he paid in round I and no one else in round II, or vice 
versa. If he pays the price also in round III, he will pay the price also in round IV or V if 
extracted because with this last payment he gets the product. If he decides to not pay the price 
in round III, he will replicate this decision also in next rounds because a player who pays one 
price and who is extracted in round IV requires a value of V greater than 7P. So, in the case of 
a payment in round III, he reaches a utility of 𝑈 = ) _$ (5𝑉 − 23𝑃), otherwise he has a utility of 
–P. The first one is greater than the second one if 𝑉 > )a b$ 𝑃. However, not all the values of this 
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range allow the player to have a positive utility. Indeed, this type of player can achieve a non-
negative utility only with a minimum value of V equal to 𝑉 = [Y b$ 𝑃. 
This analysis adds some significant range to the ones found in round IV. They are: 𝑉 > 20𝑃, 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃, 10𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃,	7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 10𝑃, [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, 𝑉 < [Y b$ . 
For all these values, the players behaviour has to be studied in round II. 
 
Round II 
 
The states of the game are essentially three: 
- the player selected in round II is on the list, 
- the player selected in round II he is not on the list and someone else paid in round I, 
- the player selected in round II he is not on the list and no one else paid in round I. 
If 𝑉 > 20𝑃, whoever is the player extracted in this round, he will pay the price. 
If 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃, a player who is the first one the list will pay the price, as a player who is 
not on the list but no one else paid in round I. The case of a player who is not on the list but in 
round I someone else paid in round I is different. This type of player gains an expected utility 
of 𝑈 = ) [p$ (𝑉 − 29𝑃) by paying the price, while he has a zero utility by not doing it. So, in 
order to pay the price, he requires at least a value of V such that 𝑉 = 29P. However, it is now 
considered the range such that 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃, which does not include this new value. For 
this reason, a player who would be the second on the list by paying the price is incentivized to 
not do it achieving a utility equal to zero.  
The same result just explained in the case of 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃 are replicated also if 10𝑃 < 𝑉 <11𝑃 and 	7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 10𝑃.  
In the case of [Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, the behaviour of a player who is on the list and of a player who 
would be the second on the list remain the same: the former one will pay the price while the 
latter will not do it. Conversely, the behaviour of a player who is not on the list and who would 
be the first one by paying changes. In fact, the utility of paying the price is 𝑈 = ) [p$ (5𝑉 −37𝑃), while the one of not doing is U = 0. Then, the player is interested in paying the price if 𝑉 > Yp b$ 𝑃. However, this value is outside the range considered. For this reason, this type of 
player will not enter the game.  
In case of the last range, 𝑉 < [Y b$ , if a player is not on the list and he is extracted in round II, 
he will not pay the price, in any case. If the selected player is already on the list, he will pay 
gaining a utility of 𝑈 = ) [p$ (19𝑉 − 73𝑃). If he does not pay the price, his utility is composed 
exclusively by the price he paid in round I, –P. The utility of paying the price is greater than 
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the one of not paying if 𝑉 < ay )_$ 𝑃. However, this value is not sufficient to guarantee a positive 
expected utility. The minimum value that make this utility function non-negative is 𝑉 < pY )_$ . 
Because of this value, in the round I a further range of values has to considered.  
 
Round I 
For ease, the analysis of the players behaviour in the first round is synthesized in the following 
table. 
 
Table 11 - Case D all potential expected utilities of players 
Interval Decision Expected payoff Optimal choice 
𝑉 > 20𝑃 To enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (73𝑉 − 144𝑃) To enter is better 
Not to Enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (7𝑉 − 21𝑃) 
11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃 To enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (41𝑉 − 145𝑃) To enter is better 
Not to Enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (7𝑉 − 21𝑃) 
7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃 To enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (33𝑉 − 147𝑃) To enter is better 
Not to Enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (7𝑉 − 21𝑃) 
[Y b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃 To enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (29𝑉 − 139𝑃) To enter is better if 𝑉 > )Y_ [_$ 𝑃 Not to Enter 𝑈 = 0 
pY )_$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < [Y b$ 𝑃 To enter 𝑈 = ) m)$ (19𝑉 − 119𝑃) Not to enter is better 
Not to Enter 𝑈 = 0 
𝑉 < pY )_$  To enter 𝑈 = −P Not to enter is better 
Not to Enter 𝑈 = 0 
 
 
 
This table shows that the first player extracted will enter the game if 𝑉 > )Y_ [_$ 𝑃 and the 
expected utility changes for some predefined ranges of values. 
Each of these ranges of values is characterized by different behaviours that players follow in 
the subsequent rounds. 
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If 𝑉 > 20𝑃, in round I and II, all players will pay the price, while in the last three rounds the 
players who will pay are: 
- the first on the list, 
- the second on the list if by paying in round III he becomes the “new” first one. 
If 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃, the player extracted in the first round will pay the price in order to receive 
the product and in round III a new player could pay the price if by doing it he becomes the 
“new” first one on the list. 
If 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃, only the player extracted in round I will pay the price again in next rounds 
in order to receive the product. 
If )Y_ [_$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, only the player extracted in the first round will pay the price in round 
from I to III, but he will not to do it in round IV if until this round he paid only once. 
If 𝑉 < )Y_ [_$ 𝑃, none of the player will pay the price in any rounds. 
 
 
4.4 Seller’s profit 
 
The last five ranges of values are essential to compute all the possible profit of the seller in 
order to analyse the optimal price that maximize it.  
If 𝑉 > 20𝑃, the seller expected profit is equal to 𝜋 = ) m)$ (259𝑃 − 79𝐶). The seller should 
choose the maximum profit in the considered range and in this case is 𝑃∗ = ) ['$ 𝑉. With this 
optimal price, the expected profit become 𝜋 = ) m)$ ([b_ ['$ 𝑉 − 79𝐶), which is positive if 𝑉 >)bm' [b_$ 𝐶. 
If 11𝑃 < 𝑉 < 20𝑃, the seller profit is 𝜋 = ) m)$ (183𝑃 − 39𝐶). In this case the price that 
maximize the profit is the lower bound of the range, i.e. 𝑃∗ = ) ))$ 𝑉. This is the maximum price 
that the seller can ask in order that customers behave as described above. The resulting profit 
is 𝜋 = ) m)$ ()mY ))$ 𝑉 − 39𝐶) that is positive if 𝑉 > )aY y)$ 𝐶. 
If 7𝑃 < 𝑉 < 11𝑃, the expected profit changes again because players modify their behaviour 
with respect to previous case. Then, the profit is 𝜋 = ) m)$ (171𝑃 − 33𝐶). As before, the optimal 
price is the lower bound of the range 𝑃∗ = ) p$ 𝑉. By substituting in the profit function, the result 
is 𝜋 = ) m)$ ()p) p$ 𝑉 − 33𝐶). This value is greater than zero if 𝑉 > pp bp$ 𝐶. 
If )Y_ [_$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃, the expected profit of the seller is equal to 𝜋 = ) m)$ (155𝑃 − 29𝐶). The 
maximum price that the profit can ask is 𝑃∗ = [_ )Y_$ 𝑉. With this value the seller payoff become 𝜋 = ) m)$ (aa_b )Y_$ 𝑉 − 29𝐶) which is positive if 𝑉 > )Y_ )bb$ 𝐶. 
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In the case of the last range, 𝑉 < )Y_ [_$ 𝑃, none of the player will enter the game. Then, the 
profit of the seller is equal to zero.  
In order to individuate the best profit for the seller is sufficient to compare the last profit 
function found with the other three ones. The result is that the profit deriving from 𝑃∗ = [_ )Y_$ 𝑉 
is greater than the other ones far any values of C (considering that it must be non-negative). So, 
the best strategy for the seller is to choose the price which incentivizes at least the first selected 
player to enter the game, that is 𝑃∗ = [_ )Y_$ 𝑉. 
The table shows all the optimal prices and profit for the best ranges of values in case A, B, C 
and D. 
 
Table 12 - Expected profit comparison among all cases 
 Interval P* Expected profit 𝝅 > 𝟎 if 
Case A )a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 	b _$ (𝑉 − 𝐶) 𝑉 > 𝐶 
Case B 
)a b$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 4𝑃 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 ) [p$ ()Y' p$ 𝑉 − 25𝐶) 𝑉 > Yb [y$ 𝐶 aa )p$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 	)a b$ 𝑃 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (Y_) [[$ 𝑉 − 19𝐶) 𝑉 > a)m Y_)$ 𝐶 
Case C 𝑉 > 7𝑃 𝑃∗ = ) p$ 𝑉 ) [p$ (bY p$ 𝑉 − 11𝐶) 𝑉 > pp bY$ 𝐶 
Case D )Y_ [_$ 𝑃 < 𝑉 < 7𝑃 𝑃∗ = [_ )Y_$ 𝑉 ) m)$ (aa_b )Y_$ 𝑉 − 29𝐶) 𝑉 > )Y_ )bb$ 𝐶 
 
 
 
4.5 Comparison with case A, B and C 
 
Case D has to be compared with the other three cases in order to establish if he is the best among 
all or if there are several optimal prices on the basis of the value of C. However, the comparison 
between cases A, B and C shows that the last one leads to a lower value of expected profits in 
any case. Then, case C can be overlooked and the residual relevant cases are A, the two ones 
of case B (B1 and B2) and D.  
By comparing these four cases, the results are the following: 
- case D is preferable than case A if 𝐶 > ))' )Y_$ 𝑉	[≈ 0.79𝑉], 
- case D is better than case B1 if 𝐶 > [[pab aapbm$ 𝑉	[≈ 0.51𝑉], 
- case D is better than case B2 if 𝐶 > ya)bp mby[a$ 𝑉	[≈ 0.75𝑉], 
- case D is positive if 𝐶 > )bb )Y_$ 𝑉	[≈ 1.115𝑉].
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The only relevant points to consider are the first and the last. In fact, if 𝐶 < ))' )Y_$ 𝑉, the best 
option between case A and D is the former. Then, the comparison between D and B1/B2 is not 
relevant because A remains the preferable case. However, case A is not the best option for all 
values, in fact for values lower than this relevant point the comparison has to be conducted 
between case A, B1 and B2. This comparison is exactly the one already performed in previous 
paragraph. Then, the only interval in which case D is better than other cases is ))' )Y_$ 𝑉 < 𝐶 <)bb )Y_$ 𝑉. For values below than the lower bound, the bests cases are the one illustrated in the 
previous comparison, While, for values beyond the upper bound, none of the cases provide 
positive expected profits. 
The following table and chart shows the expected profit considering the relevant interval 
computed so far. Considering the chart, for each range of values, the calculation is made using 
the median point as the value of the parameter C. The calculation confirms what expressed in 
the comparison among these cases and each of the four interval has a different best case. 
 
 
Table 13 - Optimal cases for the seller on the basis of parameter C 
Interval Best case 𝑷∗ 𝑪 < 𝟒𝟏 𝟑𝟎𝟖$ 𝑽 B 1 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 𝟒𝟏 𝟑𝟎𝟖$ 𝑽 < 𝑪 < 𝟔𝟏 𝟖𝟖$ 𝑽 B 2 𝑃∗ = )p aa$ 𝑉 𝟔𝟏 𝟖𝟖$ 𝑽 < 𝑪 < 𝟏𝟏𝟎 𝟏𝟑𝟗$ 𝑽 A 𝑃∗ = b )a$ 𝑉 𝟏𝟏𝟎 𝟏𝟑𝟗$ 𝑽 < 𝑪< 𝟒𝟒𝟗𝟓 𝟒𝟎𝟑𝟏$ 𝑽 D 𝑃∗ = [_ )Y_$ 𝑉 𝑪 > 𝟒𝟒𝟗𝟓 𝟒𝟎𝟑𝟏$ 𝑽 - - 
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Figure 5 - Expected profit of all cases 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS BREAKDOWN 
 
 
In the analysis of this game, some assumptions have been considered. These ones allow to make 
straightforward the solution of the various cases and to collect the key issue. These assumptions 
are: 
- all players have the same valuation, 
- all players have the same probability to enter the game, 
- valuation and costs are completely exogenous for the seller, 
- players are risk neutral, 
- the dispatch coefficient is not related to the value of the fee, 
- players know the last round of the game, 
- the absence of a time coefficient that decrease the valuation over time. 
Some of these statements are not valid in all the real situations, nonetheless they allow to 
conclude some considerations about the subject behaviours in this type of selling strategy. In 
fact, without these assumptions, the results of the various case could be different. However, all 
the assumptions just mentioned are necessary in order that the analysis of the various cases 
reveals the key features of this type of selling strategy. In the first case, the one with 3 players 
in 3 rounds and a dispatch coefficient equal to 1, the seller optimal choice is to choose the 
highest price which convinces the first player extracted to pay again the fee when selected. 
Moreover, it has been shows that a cooperation could be a better strategy for the players. In the 
case of a 2-players contract, they achieve a higher payoff if they sign the contract after the first 
round. However, the seller can retaliate by changing the price in advance, i.e. before the game 
starts. By doing so, the seller cannot ensure a higher level of profit because it depends on the 
values of V and C, which are exogenous. It means that the seller should choose the optimal 
price on the basis of these values. If the seller and the players can rely on symmetric 
information, the former could choose the optimal price knowing the level of the players 
valuation and the operating costs. Otherwise, he cannot choose with certainty the optimal price. 
In fact, he can only set a price, but the final value of the profit will depend on the exogenous 
factors. A second type of cooperation could be achieved among all the three players. In this 
case, after round I, the player excluded by the 2-players contract could propose a 3-players one, 
by paying a part of the price (with transfers) charged to the other two players. Then, the third 
player will obtain a positive payoff and the other two ones will gain a higher payoff than the 2-
players contract one. This is an optimal strategy for all the players, but the seller could retaliate 
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by choosing the highest price that the third player can pay after the transfers to the other two 
players. This option includes some uncertainty by the seller due to the presence of cooperation 
costs, relative to drawing up or bargaining of the contract. Whether the seller do not consider 
them or make an estimation error, this could nullify or lower his profit. Then the “counterattack” 
is not a best strategy for the seller because it could lead to higher as well as lower profit. 
The second case is the one which has a further round than the first one, keeping all other 
parameters equal. The analysis of this case reveals an essential feature of this type of selling 
strategies. In fact, it has been shown that a player, who is extracted and who paid in round I, 
will not pay the second fee if he is selected again in round II. It can be said that it is like he 
temporized in order to wait that another player pays the second fee in order that he receives the 
product, maximizing the utility. This type of circumstance happens with a sufficient low value 
of the price and if the player entered the game in a round “far” enough from the last one. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to add another round to a game with 3 players, 3 rounds and a dispatch 
coefficient equal to 1, in order to change some player behaviours. 
In the third case, the effect of the dispatch coefficient increase was analysed. This fact leads to 
a change of players behaviour due mainly to the relationship between the number of rounds and 
the value of the dispatch coefficient. In fact, with 4 rounds and M=2, only the first player 
extracted will be interested in the game after round I. Moreover, the maximum price which the 
first player is willing to accept drops considerably. It has been shown that for the seller the 
strategy to increase the value of M, keeping all other parameters equal, is dominated by all the 
previous ones because it leads to lower payoff with certainty. 
The last case analysis aims to verify whether an increase of the number of rounds is helpful in 
order to make the previous case an optimal strategy. The result is that this case is the best option 
for the seller only in some cases, in fact the increase of one round makes this last case the best 
one only for some values of C and V. Precisely, this case provides the best strategy if the ratio 
between C and V is high enough. Then, the increase of one round (from four to five) alongside 
the increase of the dispatch coefficient is: 
- necessary in order to make this case a best strategy, for some values, 
- not sufficient in order to make this case comparable to the second one. 
Indeed, in this case, the behaviour of the first player extracted to “wait” if selected again in the 
second round does not reveal. This means that the effect of the rounds increase is not sufficient 
to compensate the opposite effect of an increase of dispatch coefficient. 
This statement provides the possibility for the seller to analysed further case with different 
values of the parameter. Keeping a value of the dispatch coefficient equal to 2, there will be a 
determined number of rounds which confirms the behaviour of the player in the second case. 
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Then, the first player will do not pay in the two next rounds, waiting for other players payments. 
The same reasoning can be made whether the seller would want to set this parameter equal to 
3. In this case, the number of rounds must have even greater. All these decisions, has to be taken 
by the seller considering the values of C and V. 
The analysis of all the various cases lead to some issues that are summarized in the following 
statements: 
- in each case, the optimal price chosen by the seller is always the highest one, 
- increasing the number of rounds, the effect on the profit is uncertain, ceteris paribus, 
- increasing the dispatch coefficient, the optimal price drops, as well as profits, 
- increasing both dispatch coefficient and rounds, the price increase with respect to the case 
having the same value of M but less rounds, still the effect on the profits is uncertain, 
- with a sufficient high number of rounds (relatively to the other parameters), a player who 
pays in a round “far” from the last one, will wait that other participants pay the fee instead 
of paying himself. 
 
The analysis of the various cases is useful in order to understand some features of this selling 
strategy even if the real world scenario shows some further aspects. In fact, the main difference 
is that these websites rely on an unknown number of rounds and several (and a growing number 
of) customers which allow the seller to gain an increasingly higher profit. In fact, with an 
unknown number of rounds, the behavior of a player according to which he pays once and then 
he waits is repeated by all the customers through all the rounds. Then, because of the unknown 
number of rounds, the seller can rely on a value of the dispatch coefficient greater than 1. In 
fact, these websites normally apply a value of M equal to around 3 even if this can be lower or 
greater. Because of this, the waiting list becomes longer and longer each time a single customer 
adds his name on it. So, customers have to take into account also a time factor, which is the 
more relevant the bigger the number of rounds. The presence of this coefficient of time could 
lead some customers to the decision to not pay the fee. This parameter can be though as a factor 
which reduces the valuation over time. It means that when a player pays the fee and he is put 
on the waiting list, he has to consider that, when he receives the product, the latter actual 
valuation could be lower than the one assigned at the time of the payment. The more the rounds 
to wait are, the more the product could lose value. When the time coefficient is so great that the 
cost (the paid fee) overcome the benefits (the actual valuation at the product delivery), none of 
the potential customers will want to add his name. This is the moment in which the scheme 
"collapses" and the majority of the customers paid a price but is unable to receive the product. 
This is the key issue which allows to compare this scheme with all the other schemes that are 
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considered illegal. This aspect of the game has already been considered in the first chapter but 
in the case of this type of website the collapse means that not all the player can receive the 
product with the fee they paid. In fact, all websites provide an option for the customers: if they 
paid in the past and they do not want to wait more time, they can integrate the fee with another 
one in order to receive the product. Normally this is not a convenient decision for the customers 
since the total price they end up to pay is greater than the valuation. However, this option can 
be an optimal strategy for the customers if two conditions verify: 
- the scheme collapsed, i.e. no more customers join the waiting list, 
- the utility loss of adding another fee (i.e. 𝑈 = 𝑉 − 𝑄 < 0, where Q is the sum of the initial 
and the second fee) is lower than the utility loss made up by the price paid in the past (i.e. 
the case in which the customer paid only the initial fee and does not receive the product). 
Then, if 𝑉 − 𝑄 > −𝑃, the customer best strategy is to pay the second fee in order to receive the 
product, even if the total paid amount is greater than the valuation. These websites can use 
different values of Q and it mainly depends on the business model of the seller. 
Three websites of this type have been taken as sample in order to exhibit the satisfied and not 
satisfied customers. These websites use different mechanisms, as explained in chapter 1, but it 
is not relevant in order to analyze the percentage of satisfied customers. They show that the 
percentage of the first type of client is 33%, 29% and 35%, with an average of 32%. It means 
that more than two over three customers are waiting on the list that additional customers pay 
their fee. The percentage is due to the dispatch coefficient value. As said before, normally this 
parameter is equal to 3 and indeed only around a third of the customers can be considered 
satisfied. 
The ability to postpone the mechanism “collapse” depends on the ability of each seller to attract 
more and more customers. However, since the number of potential customers cannot grow 
continuously, the seller has to be able to convince old customer to repurchase (which is a 
similarity with the Ponzi scheme characteristics) or to permit the customers to leave the game, 
shortening the waiting list. This last fact leads new customers towards the website because their 
time coefficient is low since the list shortened. However, the option to allow customers to leave 
the waiting list implies that they can obtain back the fee paid (totally or partially) and this could 
be harmful for the seller activities. The reason is that the paid fees are used to purchase and 
dispatch the product to older customers on the waiting list. When a waiting customer ask his 
money back, conceptually it does not exist anymore and then the seller should refund the 
customer with his capital. It means that the seller should anticipate the money and then wait for 
new customers payments that fill the gap. This situation creates a kind of circle: 
- old customers ask their fee back, 
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- the waiting list shorten, 
- new customers pay the fee. 
This circle could permit the website to continue to be successful and to not collapse but the 
circle could involve some costs for the seller. Moreover, the number of new customers could 
be lower than the customers who left. In this case, the seller could have a monetary problem 
because the new cash in is not sufficient to repay the outflows. In this case, if the seller permits 
this practice, the sustainability of the mechanism depends on the ability of the seller to have 
always a positive amount of money to repay the old customer who want to leave. 
Concluding, the game is helpful in order to analyse the main characteristics of this type of 
selling strategy. One of them is the behaviour of the players who pay one time the price and 
then wait for additional new customers. Then, this system implies the creation of a waiting list 
and with this practice the customers can reach the maximum level of utility. However, the 
sustainability of the selling strategy, depends on a greater number of factor, as the seller cost, 
the time coefficient, or the possibility of the customers to leave the game. Further analysis could 
be conducted in order estimate these parameters and their effect on players behaviour since they 
have been excluded in the cases examined in this dissertation. Furthermore, with a deep insight 
on the costs and on the business model of the sellers (websites), it could be useful to analysis 
in details the profits also from a point of view of their sustainability over time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The aim of the dissertation is to determine the nature of this type of selling strategy and to 
analyse whether it can be qualified as a genuine mechanism of sales or otherwise it can be 
considered as a new scheme included in the illegal pyramidal scheme. 
At a first investigation, this type of selling strategy seems to recall the features of the most 
famous pyramidal or Ponzi schemes which have historically demonstrated their purpose to 
produce huge profits for the creator (and few early adopter) at the expenses of a plurality of 
clients/investors. The purpose of this new selling strategy seems to be different and it can be 
considered the classical purpose of a common company: to provide the goods to the customers 
at the right price. However, the mechanism used in order to provide this price causes the 
creation of a waiting list, implying a probability of unsustainability. Besides, from a legal point 
of view, it could operate in a legislative gap that permit this type of company to carry on its 
activities even if the creation of the waiting list recalls a pyramidal scheme aspect. One of the 
feature that could differentiate this mechanism from the classical pyramidal scheme is the 
possibility for the players to exit the game at any time. The consequence could be a utility loss, 
but it depends on the various strategies and on the business model that each website/seller 
adopts. 
The game analysis is conducted firstly with a simple case which has the minimum number of 
rounds, of players and a value of the dispatch coefficient equal to 1. This case provides the 
statement according to which the seller provides the highest potential price and only one player 
is incentivized to pay the fee. In the additional cases, the key point is the establishment of the 
effect that a change of the number of rounds or of the dispatch coefficient have on the behaviour 
held by the players. The result of these last cases provides a change in the statement of the first 
case from the players point of view. In fact, adding more rounds, a great number of players are 
interested in entering the game because they pay the price in a round “far” from the last one. It 
simply means that these players have more probability to receive the product they paid. 
Moreover, the examination of these additional cases confirmed the key issue of this type of 
selling strategy: the behaviour of the player who prefers to wait rather than pay all the necessary 
fees and, on the other side, the choice to not enter the game if a player is selected in a round 
close to the last one. All the analysed cases consider a specified number of rounds, even if the 
real scenario shows an opposite situation. In fact, the strength of this strategy resides actually 
on the unknown number of rounds. With this aspect, a greater number of players are induced 
to pay the fee. However, the behaviour of players found in the cases with a specified number 
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of round can be generalized. In fact, these behaviours can be assimilated to the case with an 
unknown number of round introducing a time coefficient. This factor leads to gradually 
decrease the total utility the player expects to gain because this parameter reduces the product 
valuation of the player. So, in a game with specified number of round, the player chooses to not 
enter the game if he had to pay in a round close to the last one. While in a game in unknown 
number of rounds this circumstance can be assimilated to the following one: player has to 
decide whether to pay or not in a round far from the first one and his time coefficient leads him 
to choose to not enter. The reason is that he should wait an amount of time such that he would 
obtain a negative utility. In fact, this is aspect the equate these two circumstances, allowing to 
compare a game with a specified last round with one with it. 
These behaviours of the players are specific of this type of selling strategy which, if it reaches 
a point of unsustainability, could cause a utility loss for the majority of the participant. Exactly 
this last one is the main downside of this type of mechanism that could allow to compare this 
selling mechanism to the most famous pyramidal scheme or scam. However, the seller who 
provide this type of purchase has the possibility to overcome this downside by allowing 
customer to leave the waiting list without a utility loss, in order to make this system clearer for 
the players and for the public. The success rate of this plan depends on the seller ability to 
manage efficiently and actively all the aspects of the website mechanism and the corresponding 
costs. As empirics shows, the rate of customers who have not been satisfied yet is on average 
two third of the total players. This system can be considered successful whether the waiting list 
continues to be active and player continue to be satisfied. So, even if players should consider 
the waiting time, the time coefficient decreasing their valuation and that, at any time, the 
number of unsatisfied players is greater than the number of satisfied one, this system could be 
genuine if the seller is able to provide a continuous replacement of the waiting list. 
Whether the seller is able to provide a sustainable mechanism with continuous substitution of 
old customers with new one, this scheme could not be considered a fraud or a scam as the Ponzi 
or the classical pyramid schemes.  
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